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A RECENTLY DISCOVERED FRAGMENT OF THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS[1]

WILLIAM H. P. HATCH
EXETER, NEW HAMPSHIRE

THE fragment which is the subject of the present article contains Romans 4:23 ([ἐγ]ράφη) — 5:3 (θλίψις) on the recto side and 5:8 ([ἡ]μῶν) — 13 (ἁμαρ[τία][2]) on the verso side of the leaf. It is the property of Dr. Leland C. Wyman of Jamaica Plain, Massachusetts, who bought it in Cairo on July 3, 1950.[2] The dealer from whom it was purchased said that the fragment was brought to him by some Arabs; and that it was found at Fusṭâṭ, which lay a little to the northeast of the modern Old Cairo (Maṣr el-Qadîmeh).[3]

The site of Fusṭâṭ is now covered with mounds of rubbish, which doubtless contain many relics of antiquity. The Roman fortress of Babylon, which was called Qaṣr esh-Shamm'eh by the Mohammedan conquerors of Egypt, stood in the eastern part of Old Cairo; and it was only about a hundred yards south of Fusṭâṭ. There were Christians in Babylon, and old or worn out books may easily have found their way from Babylon to Fusṭâṭ. Hence, although the story told by the Cairo dealer in antiquities has a familiar sound, it may well be true.

We do not know when the Gospel was first preached in Babylon. However, in the early period Christianity made rapid progress in Egypt, and by the end of the third century the new religion had become well established in the Nile valley as far up as the modern Assuân.

[1] Dr. Kurt Aland of Berlin has assigned the number 0220 to this fragment.

[2] Dr. Wyman is Professor of Biology in the College of Liberal Arts of Boston University. The text of the fragment was first recognized as a passage from Romans by Dr. F. Stuart Crawford of Boston University, who kindly translated it for Dr. Wyman.

[3] The name Fusṭâṭ is probably a corruption of the Latin *fossatum*, i.e. surrounded by a trench (*fossa*). Some derive it from the Arabic fusṭâṭ, a tent, alleging that 'Amr ibn el-'Âṣ pitched his tent on this spot when he laid siege to Babylon. This, however, seems to be merely a popular explanation of the name.

The Wyman fragment is a small piece of vellum; and it was once part of a codex, being a little more than the upper half of a leaf. It is badly damaged, but what remains of the recto side is legible. On the other hand comparatively little of the writing on the verso side can be read. An ultra-violet lamp was used, but even with its help it was impossible to decipher more than with a magnifying-glass.

The fragment is 8.8 cm. in height and 11.4 cm. in width. Originally, however, the leaf was about 15 cm. high and about 12.7 cm. wide; and the writing occupied a rectangular space measuring about 11.7 cm. x 8.5 cm. The upper margin is 1.7 cm. in width, and the outer margin is 2.2 cm. wide. Of the inner margin nothing has survived. The letters are from 2 to 2½ mm. in height, and on the average about 31 of them occur in each line. There are at present 14 lines or parts of lines on either side of the fragment, but originally each page contained 24 lines. No ruling is discernible, and the ink is brown.

The rough breathing in the angular form (⌞ and ⊢) is found a few times, but it is not employed consistently. No accents are used, and the high point is the only mark of punctuation that occurs in the fragment. Initial ι and initial υ do not have a diaeresis (ι and υ). Θεός, Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, and κύριος are the only *nomina sacra* that are found; and they are abbreviated in the customary manner, i.e. the first and last letters of each word are written and a stroke is placed above them. Ἄνθρώπους is represented by the abbreviation ΑΝΘΟῩ.

The text of the Wyman fragment is Alexandrian. In the places in which variant readings occur it agrees

with	B	8	times,	
"	ℵ	6	"	,
"	A	4	"	,
"	C	7	"	,
"	D^p	4	"	,
"	E^p	4	"	,
"	F^p	6	"	,
"	G^p	6	"	.

The Wyman fragment supports B everywhere except in 5:1, and here it contradicts the combined testimony of $B^{*}\aleph^{*}ACD^{p}E^{p}K^{ap}L^{ap}$. It never joins $\aleph ACD^{p}$ or E^{p} against B, and once it sides with $F^{p}G^{p}$ and P^{apr} against all these witnesses.

The reading of the fragment in 5:1 is interesting and important. The subjunctive ἔχωμεν is found here in $B^{*}\aleph^{*}ACD^{p}E^{p}K^{ap}L^{ap}$, whereas $B^{3}\aleph^{a}F^{pgr}G^{pgr}P^{apr}$ etc. have the indicative ἔχομεν. The Wyman fragment apparently read ἔχομεν in this verse. The first three letters of the verb stood at the end of a line, and a small hole in the vellum has destroyed the χ and the letter which followed it. However, the letter after χ must have been an ο, because the above-mentioned hole does not occupy enough space to contain the letters χ and ω. On the other hand this space would be completely filled by a χ and an ο. Moreover, a little ink can be seen at the top and on the right-hand side of the hole, and this seems to be the remainder of a letter with a closed top. Hence the letter must have been an ο and not an ω. The Wyman fragment is the earliest known witness for ἔχομεν in Romans 5:1,[4] and thus the indicative in this verse is attested by a good text which antedates the earliest testimony for the subjunctive. Furthermore, this evidence for ἔχομεν is probably pre-Hesychian. Therefore the argument for the indicative is greatly strengthened, and the claim of the subjunctive to be the right reading is correspondingly weakened.

In 5:3 the fragment has the participle καυχώμενοι instead of the finite verb καυχώμεθα; and in this reading it is supported by BC 436, 1311, and 1319, as well as by Tertullian, Origen, and Ephraem Syrus. Westcott and Hort put καυχώμενοι in the margin of their text. Again, in the same verse the Wyman fragment originally read θλεῖψις instead of θλίψις. So far as is known, this spelling is found in no other textual authority in this place; and it was corrected to θλίψις by a contemporary hand. However, long ῑ is often represented by ει in Codex Vaticanus and in Coptic manuscripts.

As was said above, very little can be read on the verso side of the fragment. However, in 5:8 ἡμῶν $\overline{\chi\sigma}$ is legible. Hence ὄντων must have been the last word on the recto side of the leaf. Thus the Wyman fragment supports $B\aleph ACD^{p}K^{ap}P^{apr}$ etc. in reading

[4] The Chester Beatty-Michigan Papyrus (P^{46}) begins at Romans 5:17.

ὄντων ἡμῶν rather than ἡμῶν ὄντων, which occurs in L^{ap} and Chrysostom. So, too, in 5:12 ὁ θάνατος is attested after ἀνθρώπους in agreement with BℵACK^{ap}L^{ap}P^{apr} etc. On the other hand the 'Western' authorities D^{p}E^{p}F^{p}G^{p} omit ὁ θάνατος here.

The writing of the Wyman fragment inclines slightly to the right, and it is essentially like the hands found in Greek papyri of the third and fourth centuries after Christ. It is radically different from the elegant script of Codex Vaticanus and Codex Sinaiticus, which were copied about the middle of the fourth century. After careful consideration the present writer thinks that the manuscript to which this badly damaged leaf belonged was written in the latter part of the third century rather than early in the fourth. If this dating is right, the Wyman fragment is the earliest known witness to the text of Romans 4:23–5:13.[4]

There can be little or no doubt about the provenance of the codex of which this fragment once formed a part. Since the text is Alexandrian and since long ῑ is represented by ε ι, the manuscript was doubtless the product of some Egyptian scriptorium.[5] Probably it was copied in the Delta, where the fragmentary leaf is said to have been found.

TEXT OF THE WYMAN FRAGMENT

Recto

1	4:23	[ἐγ]ράφη δὲ δι᾽ αὐτὸν μόνον ὅτι ἐλογί[σθη
2	24	αὐτῷ· ἀλλὰ καὶ δι᾽ ἡμᾶς οἷς μέλλε[ι] λογί[ζεσ-
3		θαι τοῖς πιστεύο[υσ]ιν ἐπὶ τ[ὸ]ν ἐγε[ίρ]οντα
4	25	[ι]ν̄ [τ]ὸν κν̄ ἡμῶν ἐκ [νεκ]ρῶν ὃς παρεδό-
5		[θ]η διὰ τὰ πα[ραπτώματα ἡ]μῶν καὶ ἠ-
6	5:1	γέρθη δι[ὰ τὴν δικαίωσιν ἡ]μῶν· δικαι-
7		ωθέντες οὖ[ν ἐκ πίστεως εἰρ]ήνην ἔ[χ]ο-
8		μεν πρὸς τὸν [θν̄ διὰ τοῦ κῡ ἡ]μ[ῶ]ν ἰῡ χῡ
9	2	δι᾽ οὗ καὶ τὴν [προσαγωγὴ]ν ἐσχήκαμεν
10		εἰς τὴν χάριν [ταύτην ἐν]ᾗ ἑστήκαμεν

[4] The Chester Beatty-Michigan Papyrus (P^{46}) begins at Romans 5:17.

[5] Codex Vaticanus, in which ε ι frequently stands for long ῑ, was written in Egypt. See J. H. Ropes, The Text of Acts (in F. J. Foakes Jackson and K. Lake's The Beginnings of Christianity, London, 1920–33, Part I, Vol. III), pp. xxxiv–xxxvi.

11 καὶ καυχώμ[εθα ἐπ᾽ ἐλπίδ]ι τῆς δόξης
12 3 τοῦ θυ· οὐ μό[νον δέ, ἀδελφ]οί, ἀλ[λ]ὰ [6] καὶ καυ-
13 χώμενοι ἐ[ν ταῖς θλίψεσιν εἰδότες ὅτι ἡ
14 θλῖψις [7]

It is most regrettable that the Wyman fragment is so small. Nevertheless, on account of its age and the excellence of its text it is a welcome addition to the list of New Testament textual authorities.

[6] In line 12 the remainder of some word can be seen before ἀλλά. The only variant reading recorded after μόνον δέ is τοῦτο, which is found in D^{p*gr}; but the two letters which immediately preceded ἀλλά seem to have been ο and ι. In an average line of thirty-one letters there would have been room for seven letters between μόνον δέ and ἀλλά. Therefore one or more words which are not attested by any known witness must be lost at this place. The word before ἀλλά probably ended in οι, and it may have been the vocative ἀδελφοί. If so, the fragment read οὐ μόνον δέ, ἀδελφοί, ἀλλὰ καὶ καυχώμενοι κτλ. However, it must be remembered that ἀδελφοί is not found here in any textual authority.

[7] Θλίψις *corr. ex* θλεῖψις *manu eiusdem aetatis cum scriba.*


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THE PRESOCRATIC WORLD-PICTURE[1]

W. K. C. GUTHRIE

PETERHOUSE, CAMBRIDGE

I recently became aware that I had for a long time entertained certain preconceptions about the way in which Presocratic thinkers saw the world, without ever having seriously considered the evidence on which my belief was based. This I have now tried to do, with the results which are set forth in this paper. Since in any case it will deal, in a fairly general way, with problems concerning the interaction of philosophical and religious thought in early Greece, I hope it will have a certain interest, whether or not its readers agree with the thesis put forward. The perennial fascination of that topic has been enhanced in recent years by the discussion provoked by Werner Jaeger's book on The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers, from which I take this sentence as a kind of text for my own reflections: "Though philosophy means death to the old gods, it is itself religion."

The thesis is this, that in bare but significant outline, a common picture of the nature of the Universe, of living creatures, and of divinity was shared by a surprising number of Greek philosophical and religious thinkers of the 6th and early 5th centuries B.C., in spite of the vast differences of temperament which led them to create systems so varied in detail and in philosophical tendency. This world-picture was not the creation of any one of them, but rather seems to have been assumed by all at the outset, as is also suggested by certain indications in Greek literature that it was shared by the unphilosophical multitude. Moreover, if I am right, to grasp the nature of this framework is essential to an understanding of the solutions offered to the problem of existence both by rationalist cosmology and by mystical religion.[2] I cannot here give all the evidence for its validity, nor attempt to solve the question

[1] This paper has been much improved as a result of discussions with Mr. G. S. Kirk, who must not, however, be thought to agree with every point made in it.

[2] By 'mystical' in this context I mean that type of religion which envisages the possibility of a union, however achieved, between human and divine.

whence it arose in the first place, if it was not from the mind of any single Greek thinker — whether from earlier Hellenic mythology, from Oriental lore, or from some universal trait of human psychology. What I shall do is, first, to describe this outline-picture simply and briefly without reference to any evidence. Then I shall try to show, by means of some examples, how it can be detected behind various philosophical and religious systems of Greece before the time of Socrates, and to estimate its effect upon them.

We live in a world, or universe, to which I shall refer, as did some of the Greeks themselves, by the name of 'kosmos.' The word 'universe' is too wide, suggesting that it contained the whole sum of existence, which I shall argue was not the case. 'World,' on the other hand, might be too narrow, since we sometimes use it to signify only the earth. From the time of Anaximander, the kosmos was usually regarded as spherical, though Anaximenes may have believed it, exceptionally, to be a hemisphere. It was bounded by the sky, whose spherical shape seemed to most to be a plain inference from observation, when its direct impact on the eye was combined with a study of the motions of the fixed stars, which were generally supposed to lie on its circumference. The earth, which might be either spherical or cylindrical in shape, lay at the centre of this sphere, and Anaximander had already advanced to the view that it could float freely in space without the need of any material support. Within the sphere, at different levels, the sun, moon and planets move in their orbits.

Beyond the cosmic sphere — and this is the essential part of my description — there was very far from being nothingness. It floated, as it were, in a circumambient substance of infinite, or at least of indefinite extent. This substance was of a purer, higher nature than those which made up the contents of the kosmos itself. It was alive and eternally so, sentient and intelligent, in fact 'the divine element' (*τὸ θεῖον*). In its pristine purity and perfection, it existed only outside the kosmos, but — what is of the highest importance for religion and philosophy alike — in more or less adulterated form it penetrated the kosmos and was mingled with its creatures.

The contents of the kosmos, apart from any share which they may have in this divine substance, are composed of the four 'op-

posites': hot, cold, wet and dry. To ask whether the neuter adjectives refer to qualities or substances would be anachronistic. The contrary natures of these account for the destructibility of the composite creatures of the physical world, since they are mutually destructive.

> "Hot, cold, wet and dry, four champions fierce,
> Strive here for mastery."

The divine, on the other hand, has none of the contraries in its nature, since it exists eternally, exempt from generation and decay. Whether it is in any sense physical, and if so of what kind of body, is a question which will turn up at various stages of our discussion.

That is the general picture. Can we suppose that it was accepted by such diverse thinkers as the Milesian cosmologists, Heraclitus, the Orphic writers of religious poems, and others? And how did it affect their views on that primary concern of the religious mind, the nature of the human soul and its relation to the universe in which it lives?

The early 6th century B.C. saw a simultaneous outburst of spiritual activity in two spheres which superficially seem widely different. There was the intense intellectual curiosity about the origin and nature of the universe, and attempt to solve its problems by rational means, which is represented by the Milesians Thales Anaximander and Anaximenes; and there was the deeply religious conception of the nature and fate of the human soul, and of the means to its salvation, which is generally called Orphic because there is good evidence that it was taught, even if not exclusively, in certain religious poems attributed to the authorship, or at least the inspiration, of the mythical singer Orpheus.

Since the Milesians assumed that the universe had evolved from a single basic substance, their problem was that of the One and the Many, i.e. in this case what was the nature of this one original substance and how had it become differentiated into the multiplicity which we see today? Concerning the world of Thales, generated from moisture — the precondition of life, as Aristotle noted — we know too little to say whether it fits in with the picture I have outlined. At least the statements attributed to him, that the whole is alive and full of gods or spirits, need not conflict with it.

Anaximander called the first substance the Boundless or the Undefined. According to Aristotle (whom, with Burnet, Ross and others, I am inclined to believe), he argued that none of the physical bodies in the present kosmos could be primary, since owing to their antagonism it would not have produced the others but rather have prevented their ever coming into existence. In this undifferentiated mass, the antagonistic properties were as yet latent. Since it was eternally in motion, it happened that in a certain part of it the 'opposites' began to separate themselves out. Hence arose what Anaximander called the germ (*γόνιμον*) of a kosmos; and I do not think that this use of language appropriate to *organic* nature was metaphorical. It is unnecessary to trace again the development of the embryo world, or re-assess the mixture of unconsciously surviving mythical thought and precociously scientific acumen which it displays. Our interest is in the matrix in which the kosmos was formed, and which still encompasses it all round. It is the *arche*, archetype or original stuff of everything, and must have existed from all time. This one might suppose, in an age of evolutionary science, to be the lowest and most elementary form of matter. Not so the Greek. "And this, they say," wrote Aristotle in describing the views of these early philosophers, "is the divine; for it is immortal and indestructible, as Anaximander and most of the natural philosophers maintain."[3] It was not only said to 'encompass' all things, but also to 'guide' or 'govern' them. For a Greek philosopher of this and later ages the essential mark of life was the power of self-movement. This the *arche* must have if the kosmos is to come to birth within it and there is no prior *arche* to move it. It was then something living. And to all Greeks, whether philosophers or not, everlasting life was the essential mark of a god. 'Gods' and 'immortals' were interchangeable terms. The philosophers had outgrown the anthropomorphic conceptions of their contemporaries, but they had by no means given up the idea of divinity, and that was how they still interpreted it. It may have been Anaximander himself who substituted the more abstract term 'divinity' for the more concrete term 'god,' as Jaeger thinks. It would be in keeping with his other neuter expressions 'the hot,' 'the cold' and so forth. But so long as the idea is retained, other

[3] Phys. iii. 4. 203 b 13.

characteristics besides the bare scientific minimum of self-motion are bound to cling to it. It must for instance be sentient and thinking.

This characteristic of the primal world-stuff comes out more clearly in the thought of Anaximander's younger contemporary Anaximenes, and still more clearly in the 5th century philosopher Diogenes of Apollonia, who followed Anaximenes in holding this substance to be a form of air. For the ability of air to generate other forms of matter, these two appealed to the phenomena of condensation and rarefaction. Moreover since in accordance with the ideas of the time it must also be shown to be the life-principle, they explicitly drew the parallel between its action in the universe and the function of souls in human bodies. "Just as our soul" said Anaximenes, "which is air, is the controlling and unifying principle in us, so breath and air surround the whole kosmos."[4] The genuineness of this particular fragment has been doubted, but largely from a prior belief that such a parallel would not have been drawn until a later date. Since, however, I have been struggling in vain against a growing conviction that this close relationship between the divine principle without and the soul within was precisely a mark of 6th century thought — taken so much for granted that it underlies Milesian cosmology and Orphic theology alike — I naturally do not find this argument strong. Whether or not it is a word-for-word quotation, I take it to be a correct statement of his belief. There is in any case other evidence that Anaximenes described the soul of man as air, which was also for him the self-moving stuff of the whole universe.

Diogenes, his follower, started by repeating the Milesian principle that "all things are differentiations of the same thing,"[5] and naming this thing as air. Like the others he conceived himself to be giving a rational and scientific account, and for the most part his language is correspondingly matter-of-fact. Yet when he comes to describe this primal air, there is a more exalted ring about his phrases. "That which has intelligence," he says, "is in my view what men call air; and by it all are steered, and it has power over all; I believe that this very thing is God, and reaches everything,

[4] Fr. 2 DK.
[5] Fr. 2 DK.

and orders all things, and is in all things, and there is not anything which does not partake in it."[6] (Jaeger has drawn attention to the hymnodic form and phraseology of this fragment.) It is consistent with this when Theophrastus ascribes to him the assertion that in living creatures "the air within," i.e. the soul, is "a small part of the god."[7]

If we turn from these attempts at scientific cosmology to the contemporary mystical tradition which I shall call Orphic, we find beliefs like these. The soul is alien to the body, which is to it like a prison or a tomb from which it cries out for release.[8] But it is caught not only in a single body but in a weary cycle of existence which involves its incarceration in a whole series of bodies, animal or human — for all nature is akin. (We may perhaps allow ourselves to be reminded of the single basic substance of the Milesians.) At death it goes to a place of punishment or happiness, according to the life it has led, which is temporary. Every thousand years it must be reincarnated in a mortal body. But performance of the proper rituals and adherence to the prohibitions of the Orphic life could so purify the soul that after ten incarnations, perhaps even after three successive Orphic lives, it could escape from the body altogether. It would then be itself a god, happy, blessed and immortal.[9]

In what kind of cosmology were these events set? Could it have been anything like that depicted by the Milesian rationalists? Aristotle gives us a clue, for he says (De an. 410 b 28) that the Orphic poems teach that "the soul comes into us from the whole as we breathe, borne by the winds." In spite of the sharp antithesis between soul and body, we are not yet at the stage when the former can be thought of as non-material. It is of the nature of air, as in the Milesian tradition, at least when it enters the body. In Greek thought in general, both popular and philosophical, *aer* was the less pure substance which filled the lower reaches of the sky around the earth. It meant cloud as much as air. In the glorious

[6] Fr. 5.

[7] DK ii p. 56 l. 3.

[8] For Linforth's view of this passage (Arts of Orpheus, University of California Press 1941, p. 147), see Guthrie, The Greeks and their Gods (Methuen 1950) p. 311 n. 3.

[9] For the evidence on which this paragraph is based, see Guthrie, Orpheus and Greek Religion (Methuen 1935) ch. v.

outer heavens was not *aer* but *aither*, the name of which is taken from the root of αἴθειν 'to blaze,' so that it was often identified with fire. *Aither* was living and divine. A character in Euripides says that it is what men mean by Zeus, and indeed the fairly general use of the name Zeus to mean the sky points in the same direction. The mystic believed that this was the substance to which man's soul was akin and with which it could be utterly identified if we could slough off the impurities of intra-cosmic existence and realize the divine that was in us. So long as it is caught in the wheel of reincarnation it is, as Empedocles said of himself, tossed about among the four cosmic elements in the regions of *aer*. These elements to the Milesian philosopher were the ceaselessly-warring opposites, and the reason, in Empedocles's doctrine, why the soul is at their mercy is an appropriate one: it is that in its sinfulness it put its trust in the works of strife and bloodshed. Thus the escape from the 'weary wheel' (to use the Orphic phrase) is at the same time an escape outside the kosmos, towards reunion with the pure, divine substance — the δῖος αἰθήρ — that lies outside.

This union of the individual soul with the *aither* may not always have been linked in the Greek mind with the elaborate Orphic doctrine of the cycle of reincarnation. In itself it seems to have been fairly widespread. There are several references to it in Euripides, besides the line of the epitaph on the Athenians who fell at Potidaea in 432:

"*Aither* received their souls, their bodies earth." [10]

If I may be allowed to adduce also a late witness, I think that the description of the next world in Vergil's Aeneid owes much to the Orphic doctrine, and Elysium is there said to lie "in the broad fields of the air." (Aen. vi. 887.) It is explained that at this stage the souls which must submit to reincarnation are not yet sorted out from the more fully purified. These latter, when the circle (*orbis*) of their time is complete, will have sloughed off the last of

[10] I.G. i. 442. If some think this is to read too much into the inscription, I can only state my own opinion, which is based on the general belief in the divinity of *aither*, on parallels like Eur. Hel. 1014 ff. (quoted below, p. 98), and on other considerations which find their place in my text. Their cumulative effect seems to me considerable.

the impurity which clings to them, and what will be left is described as "the aetherial sense, the fire of unmixed ray" (ib. 743 ff.).

In comparative studies it is sometimes said that the Orphic doctrine must always be opposed to any system which involves the annihilation of a soul's individuality after death, since the permanence of individuality is required by the doctrine of reincarnation. It is true that so long as the soul is destined for reincarnation it must retain its individuality. But there is a misunderstanding here which vitiates the comparison, and it is due to a failure to visualize this very widely accepted world-picture which the Orphics shared with others. To them the real contrast was not between life and death — life in the body on earth and life out of it — but between what went on within the kosmos and what outside it. It is between life within the circle of reincarnation — during which, whether in or out of the body, the soul has the taint of the body clinging to it — and the bliss of escape and reunion, which is the only true immortality. Retention of individuality means that the soul is still *airy*, still clogged with the lower elements within the kosmos. The final goal, like that of every true mystic, is the utter *loss* of self in the infinity of the divine.

I hope I have shown that the thinkers so far mentioned shared that general picture of the universe which I described at the beginning. To select (for it is necessary here to be selective) a more difficult case, can we say the same about the enigmatic Heraclitus at the beginning of the 5th century? Most people would say no, and those who might be inclined to agree with me are not on the whole the people who have used the soundest arguments about this remarkable man. Heraclitus seems to have founded his whole cosmology on a ruthless acceptance of the doctrine of opposites with all its consequences. The components of the kosmos were engaged in endless warfare, and each lives by the death of the other (fr. 76 Diels-Kranz). Any apparent stability is as the stability of two armies locked in deadly conflict of which neither has as yet prevailed. Peace and harmony, such as the Pythagoreans desired, would be undesirable even if possible, for they would mean universal death. Flux and change are the conditions of life: war is the father of all (fr. 53, cf. 80). He said that his kosmos was

always and is and will be an ever-living fire, in measures being kindled and in measures extinguished (fr. 30). Clearly he did not believe, like those against whom he fulminates, that it was at any time generated from a single basic substance. The fire which is for ever being kindled and extinguished provided the best description of the everlasting change and mutual destruction by which the kosmos lives (cf. fr. 90).

We may notice, however, that this description is applied to κόσμον τόνδε, 'this order' or 'this organism.' Pythagoras was credited with having been the first to give the word 'kosmos' the definite meaning of 'world,' and we are perhaps not justified in assuming that with a thinker so little later as Heraclitus it had crystalized so as to have that meaning naturally and inevitably. Nevertheless, even if he had in mind, as I have suggested, its more general meaning of 'order' or 'organism,' I have little doubt that the order to which he refers is the world of our direct experience, that in which the natural elements, or opposites, play their parts — in fact that part of the whole sum of existence in which his predecessors too had recognized the presence and interaction of contraries, though without drawing the same uncompromising conclusions as their critic. Yet in view of his tirades against them we must look for something more positive than this if we are going to maintain that he too believed that this was not all, but that there was an ageless and deathless divine substance outside the kosmos. Is there any evidence at all for the existence of something stable and permanent in his system, outside the flux of the 'way up and down'?

We immediately think of that strange conception which he called the *logos*. It is first of all the word or message which he brings, but one with a curiously independent existence, for he can exhort men to listen "not to me but to the logos" (fr. 50). Next, in spite of the doctrine of universal flux, he says that it "exists for ever," (fr. 1)[11] and that "all things come to pass in accordance with this *logos*" (fr. 1). He also identifies it with what he calls "the common" (fr. 2, cf. 113). There is, he says, a world common to all, but men are like sleepers, each living his private dream and not waking up to

[11] Aristotle remarked (Diels-Kranz A 4, vol. i, p. 144, and note on p. 150) that the word ἀεὶ in this sentence might qualify either the preceding ἐόντος or the following ἀξύνετοι. I am inclined to think that H. intended the former, but in any case the permanence of the λόγος is sufficiently evident apart from this particular phrase.

the real world which all share alike (fr. 89). The *logos* describes, the *logos is*, this common element, which clearly therefore has a permanent validity transcending the flux of generated things.

It may still be said that, after all, *logos* only means something like 'word,' 'account' or 'argument,' whereas what we are looking for is a substantial and (so far as we have met it hitherto) material reality. But is that all that *logos* means to Heraclitus? We know at least that the divine and ruling element of the earlier cosmologies was at the same time identified with the primal and everlasting stuff from which the kosmos had evolved. One reason, I am convinced, for the notorious obscurity of Heraclitus is that thought has now reached a stage when matter and spirit (or the abstract) really require to be separated, but the separation has not yet been consciously effected. His ruling principle has become more and more intellectualized, as its name *logos* suggests, but to think of it as non-material is as yet beyond his range. "Wisdom," he wrote, "is one thing, to know the *gnome* — thought — which steers all things through all things" (fr. 41). Thought (and the *gnome* is surely the same thing as the *logos*) is the active principle directing the universe, as in the earlier philosophers, and the word 'steer' (*κυβερνᾶν*) is that already used of the divine substance by Anaximander as also later by Diogenes with his air-god and others. For the next step we have to rely not on an actual fragment of Heraclitus but on a statement of his views by Sextus Empiricus, who has been accused of importing into them at this point the doctrines of post-Aristotelian philosophers like the Stoics. If I do not see the need to associate myself with the accusation, it is because the doctrine in question is one which we have already found in such diverse pre-Platonic thinkers as Anaximenes, the Orphics and Diogenes of Apollonia, and could find also (on Aristotle's testimony) in Democritus; the doctrine, namely, that there is an immortal mind-stuff of which mortal creatures acquire a tincture by breathing it in either as air itself or with the air. Heraclitus, then, said Sextus (Diels-Kranz A 16, vol. i, p. 148), held that "what surrounds us" (*τὸ περιέχον ἡμᾶς*) is rational and endowed with mind, and this divine reason (*logos*), according to him, we draw in by breathing and thus become thinking creatures ourselves. Here again we have the divine substance, though also called by Heraclitus *logos*, ap-

pearing as something akin to air or breath,[12] and we may also safely identify it with the fire which occupied such a paramount place in his system. According to the Christian writer Hippolytus (Ref. ix. 10), Heraclitus "says that this fire is rational and is the cause of the ordering of the whole." The notion of a 'fire' which was 'rational' illustrates well the curious stage of thought when matter and spirit are tugging at the bonds which unite them, but have not yet got free. It is of course true that later philosophies like the Stoic deliberately adopted a materialistic pantheism even after the distinction drawn so sharply by Plato; but when the actual fragments of Heraclitus are compared with the paraphrases of later writers, it is quite clear that he is still at the more naïve stage before any distinction had been consciously drawn. His conception is no more than a development of the living and divine world-stuff of the Milesians.

There is of course no inconsistency in identifying the divine *logos* at once with air and fire. Both in earlier cosmologies and in popular belief, as we have seen, the air around us was only the less pure form of the fiery element — called indifferently fire or *aither* — which occupied the outer regions of the sky. In its pure form it is not visible flame, but something invisible, which Aristotle describes as 'a dry exhalation' (Meteor. 341 b 6 ff). By the time it reaches our nostrils it has of course lost its pristine purity, and therefore the life and intellect which it gives to us, though containing a divine element, have not the perfection of the fiery mind which rules the universe.

This view of the soul's nature is carried out, somewhat quaintly, in the further fragments referring to it. Since its true nature is fiery, therefore "the dry soul is wisest and best" (fr. 118). The wetter a soul the worse it is (the foolish behaviour of drunkards is, in fr. 117, brought into connection with this), and "to become water is death to souls" (fr. 36, cf. 77). But death is not complete extinction. Souls, like the fiery sun and everything else in the kosmos, must continue to alternate on the upward and downward path of destruction and rebirth, and so he continues: "but out of water

[12] R. B. Onians (The Origins of European Thought, Cambridge 1951) has noted that in an age before writing has become familiar, speech and thought are naturally conceived materially, as composed of breath. He brings this idea into connection with Heraclitus's *logos* on p. 77, n. 9.

comes soul." Because the soul is thus involved in the eternal flux, where nothing is the same for two instants together, most scholars have held that Heraclitus could have had no belief in its immortality like that of the Pythagoreans and Orphics. But the law of flux applies only to the kosmos, not to the fiery divinity which in its purity surrounds it. If I am asked how in this particular case I know that in its pure state it lies around, i.e. outside the kosmos rather than within its boundary — that conviction which as I say has been gradually and almost involuntarily growing on me — I can only reply that, were it wholly within it, it would be subject to its flux and change, and could not be steadfast, a λόγος ἐὼν ἀεί.

If then a soul lives a foolish, or wet life, it goes the way of water and its labours in the cosmic treadmill may be endless; but if it is wise, and learns to follow the *logos*, to which it is akin, then by all the habits of ancient thought it will be assimilated to that *logos* and escape outside the kosmos from the cycle of becoming. As a character in Euripides says (Hel. 1014 ff.) echoing one of the more esoteric of contemporary beliefs; "The mind of the dead lives not, yet is its thought (γνώμη) immortal, as it plunges into the immortal *aither*." For all his haughty independence, I do not think that Heraclitus freed himself from this conception of the philosophical religion of his time.

In the slightly later figure of Empedocles we find a unique combination of the scientific and mystical sides of thought. Of him indeed, as Freeman truly said,[13] we hardly know how to speak, and we sometimes feel inclined to echo the verdict of Lucretius that he 'seems scarce born of mortal stock.' Here I must limit myself strictly to what is relevant to my theme. Parmenides had shown up the logical difficulties involved in any theory which derived the world from a single substance. Empedocles therefore promoted the four commonly recognized substances — earth, water, air and fire — to the rank of primary elements, or 'roots' as he called them. The manifold and changing world was the result of temporary combinations of these indestructible root-substances in different proportions. They did not combine of their own independent motion or volition. For the first time the cause of motion is separated

[13] History of Sicily ii. 342.

from the bodies moved. There were two contrary forces working in the world, which he named Love and Strife. In the scientific parts of his writings they appear as purely physical forces of attraction and repulsion. Love, or Harmony, draws portions of the diverse elements together to form composite creatures: Strife separates them into great masses of their own kind like the earth or the sea. The world-process is one of alternating epochs, in which Love and Strife prevail in turn.

Yet not even now, when moving force has been separated from moved bodies, are the forces thought of as non-material. They are in space, like subtle self-moving currents of fluid or vapour. Consequently the time of the triumph of Love, when she holds all the elements in complete fusion, is described in spatial terms as the time when Love has penetrated the kosmos through and through, and driven Strife outside, where it lies all around like an envelope. In due course Strife begins to penetrate again and Love is gradually driven outside. A world such as we live in is of course only possible in the intermediate stages, when the elements are partly separated and partly combined. Our own is the period when Strife is gaining ascendency. At this point we touch the religious side of the system, and learn that the two opposite forces are not only physical but moral in their effects. Love or Harmony is the force of good, and Strife of evil, for Empedocles, following his Pythagorean and Orphic teachers, is a convinced moral dualist. He adapted to his own cosmology the Orphic doctrines of the soul and its doom of reincarnation. It is a fallen *daimon*, a being akin to the gods. When men first appeared on the earth the influence of Love was far stronger, and they were sinless. But Strife corrupted them, and they turned to sin and above all to bloodshed. From that time they are condemned to wander, as he says, "thrice ten thousand seasons from the abodes of the blessed, being born in all manner of mortal forms." He himself is one of these, "an exile from the gods and a wanderer," tossed without rest from one element to another.

Yet it was not too late to turn again to the ways of Love, and the soul which did so might when its allotted time was up win freedom from the cycle of births and rejoin the divinity to which it was akin. Empedocles knew this, and felt that his release was at hand. Hence his proud boast: "I am among you as an immortal

god, no longer a mortal," strikingly echoed by the well-known verses scratched on sheets of gold and interred in the grave of an initiate of a mystic sect in his own Western land. There the soul is assured that if it can prove its initiated status to the guardians of the next world, they will greet it with the welcome: "Happy and blessed one, thou shalt be god instead of mortal."

Now I feel sure that Empedocles's views on the soul were intended to fit into his whole world-system. Some have thought this impossible, on the ground that his scientific views left no room for Orphic doctrines of a reincarnated and potentially divine soul. This is in fact the recognized crux of his thought. Certainly so far as the empirical world was concerned, he was a thorough-going materialist, even extending his materialism to the mechanism of sensation and thought. "To Empedocles" said Aristotle (De an. 427 a 21 ff.) "sensation and thought are alike of the body," and it seems to be true. A line of Empedocles himself mentions the blood about the heart as the reasoning part of man. Thus the nexus of faculties whereby we perceive and draw conclusions about the world around us was clearly considered by him to belong to man in his incarnate state, to be a function of the body and therefore only a resultant of that temporary and perishable combination of the physical root-substances. To suppose that in speaking of the divine and immortal part of himself he meant these sensitive and reasoning faculties of the incarnate mortal is indeed to accuse him of gross inconsistency. But there is no need so to suppose. He appears not to have called the divine self ψυχή, the usual Greek word for the soul. It is a *daimon*, to whom the body and all its organs are alien.[14] "Clothed in an unfamiliar garment of flesh" is how he describes it (fr. 126). There is much earlier lore about *daimones*, which he must have taken for granted. The history of the conception is quite different from that of ψυχή, and in many ways foreign to our own associations with the word 'soul.' Sometimes *daimon* is used interchangeably with θεός, god. Where there is a distinction, as in Plato's Symposium, *daimones* are a race of intermediate beings dwelling in the elements between heaven and earth. They go up and down over the earth clad in *aer*, says Hesiod. Similarly in

[14] This point is made by E. R. Dodds in The Greeks and the Irrational (University of California Press 1951), pp. 152 f.

Empedocles (as Rostagni noted) the drama of the *daimon* is enacted among the elements between heaven and earth; and as he, following the Pythagorean and Orphic tradition, believed, it can for its sins be imprisoned in a mortal body, though itself an alien spirit. This it is which in stories of strange seers like Abaris, Epimenides and Hermotimus, could leave the body temporarily in search of divine knowledge. This it is which in Pindar's words is active when the limbs are sleeping. For its permanent release knowledge is indeed necessary, but not the knowledge of the senses, whose object is the elements within the kosmos, and whose foundation as we have seen is purely material. "With earth we see earth, with water, water." (fr. 109 v. i.) On the other hand "Blessed is the man who has gained the riches of divine wisdom" (fr. 132). Like knows like, and to know the divine means to become divine, and moreover: "It is not possible for us to set the divine before our eyes, or to lay hold on it with our hands." (fr. 133.)

There *is* a divinity outside the natural world. It has no bodily parts at all, but is "only a sacred and unutterable Mind darting through the whole world with rapid thoughts" (fr. 134). To this divinity there is something in ourselves that is akin.

Much must no doubt remain obscure. Even if we possessed the whole of his works, it would not be easy to penetrate the inmost thoughts — the *adyta cordis* — of a man like this. The fragments do not make clear the relationship of the divine Mind to Love, but they must, one would think, have been practically identical, Love representing the work of this Mind in so far as it enters the kosmos, where as we saw it finds itself opposed by the power of evil. Hippolytus (vii. 31), in a passage somewhat overlaid by Stoic preconceptions, speaks of the δίκαιος λόγος in Empedocles as something mediating between the contrasting principles of Love and Strife and working on the side of Love. We know from the fragments the importance of *logos* in his system. Perhaps this, the typically Hellenic spirit of just proportion and measure, is the divine element, the sacred Mind, like the *logos* of Heraclitus. This is speculative, but at least if we recall our general cosmological framework — the spherical kosmos of warring opposites lapped in the circumambient divine, which in a more or less adulterated

form penetrates the cosmic sphere — we can I think find places in it for Empedocles's sacred Mind, his Love, his *daimones* which are fallen gods and at the same time our own true selves. For to mystic and rationalist alike small portions of the divine were imprisoned in animal and human bodies. And Empedocles was both rationalist and mystic.

We must not lose sight of what even a modern authority like Arnold Toynbee calls the "thoroughly scientific nature" of Empedocles's thought, nor forget that in his materialistic physical system there was no room for any divine purpose or intelligent creation. Our kosmos is the purely chance result of the interplay of opposite forces of attraction and repulsion. Things combined "as they happened to run together" (fr. 59). Apparent teleological development is explained on a theory of the survival of the fittest. Have we then at last caught Empedocles thinking in water-tight compartments? It may seem strange, indeed scarcely defensible, to explain the physical universe thus on the lines of a purely mechanistic materialism and at the same time to believe in the existence of a "sacred and unutterable mind darting through the whole kosmos with rapid thoughts." But was it not of the essence of early Greek cosmology and mysticism to hold that the whole matter and order of the kosmos were the enemy of divinity? We may usefully draw a distinction between these ideas as the Presocratic philosophers used them and as they were modified and transmuted by Socrates and Plato.

Plato was immensely attracted by the Orphic view that the soul was alien to the body, something whose true home was not of this world. With that went a belief in the necessary imperfection of the material world in contrast to the perfection of the eternal realities and of deity. But on one point he and Socrates protested vigorously against the world-picture of all their predecessors, rational and mystical alike. For it was a conscious protest against all of them when Socrates in the Phaedo, speaking in particular of Anaxagoras, maintained that if there were a divine mind, then it must have ordered all things for the best. This was only to bring into the open a contradiction of which earlier thinkers seem to have been curiously unaware. It was exactly as Socrates complained. They spoke of a divinity; they even said, in their favorite phrase, that

it 'steered all things'; but when it came to explaining the genesis and maintenance of the physical world, they made no use of the divine principle as a cause, but only adduced, as he said, 'airs and aethers and waters and many other absurdities.' It must be admitted, says Plato in the Timaeus,[15] that because of the irreducible minimum of irrationality in matter, this world of ours can never be perfect or eternal; but because God is the orderer of it, he has ensured that it is the best that any physical world could be — in fact a reflection of the eternal world in terms of time and matter. Here we step from the Presocratic world to the Platonic; and we may judge both of the difference between them and of the extent to which the one prepared the ground for the other.

One general point in conclusion. There is a temptation for us, as historians of Greek religion, to be a little over-analytical in our approach. Regarding rationalist and mystic as contrasting and mutually exclusive terms, we are apt to classify our Greeks as belonging to one or the other class — the Milesians on one side of the fence, the Orphics on the other, with a disapproving frown for Empedocles because he insists on keeping one leg on each side. Surely what Empedocles should teach us is that we are in a period of thought before such distinctions had any meaning. All shared a common background which was neither rational nor mystical exclusively. To ignore or deny this background called for a degree of originality of which few were capable. I have expressed my belief that even the contemptuous and highly individual Heraclitus was unable to free himself from it, and though my examples could not be exhaustive, the Pythagorean idea that the *ouranos* breathes in some of the infinite breath outside seems to presuppose a similar framework.[16] (How for the Pythagoreans anything ἄπειρον could be divine is perhaps a problem, which at present I can only mention.) One man must be admitted to have denied the general scheme, the most self-sufficient and original of them all, whose thought was a challenge to subsequent Greek philosophy. The way of truth according to Parmenides leaves no room for any infinite divine substance beyond the one spherical Being. But I doubt if there is any other clear exception. Aristotle, who perhaps under-

[15] 29 e foll., 37 d.
[16] Aristotle, Phys. iv. 6. 213 b 23.

stood his predecessors better than some modern scholars will allow, showed himself aware of the general view when he wrote that there was indeed a lot of mythical lumber in the thought of the ancients, such as the representation of gods in the form of men and even of animals, but that all alike shared one central idea, namely that "all nature is encompassed with the divine." And in this, he added, they were right.

ATHENS, ELEUSIS, AND THE HOMERIC HYMN TO DEMETER *

FRANCIS R. WALTON

The University of Chicago

The Homeric Hymn to Demeter is the earliest and, for us, the single most important literary record of the Eleusinian Mysteries. These Mysteries were for a thousand years one of the crowning glories of Athens,[1] the pride of her statesmen, poets, and orators, a focal point of piety which though intimately civic was at the same time panhellenic. The constant references to the cult in both prose and poetry attest its popularity and singular importance. Yet it remains a curious fact that in all Athenian literature, at least until Hellenistic times, there is no direct mention of the Homeric Hymn and scarcely anything which can reasonably be identified even as a reminiscence or echo of it.[2] Apparently the Hymn was allowed to fall into almost total oblivion. Why this should have happened is a question that seems to merit some consideration. By the very nature of the problem the evidence is inadequate to assure definite conclusions, but it is hoped that the solution proposed, though necessarily tentative, may add somewhat to our understanding of an obscure but interesting period in the religious history of Athens.

The pre-eminent position of the Mysteries is too familiar to require elaborate documentation. One of the earliest and one of the latest of preserved Athenian public decrees are regulations govern-

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[1] G. E. Mylonas, The Hymn to Demeter and her Sanctuary at Eleusis (Saint Louis, 1942), 3–5, on archaeological grounds sets the terminus ante quem for the cessation of the Mysteries in the middle or latter part of the 5th century of our era. Nothing, in fact, indicates that the cult persisted after the edict of Theodosius in 391 A.D.

[2] The thought and to some extent the language of lines 480–482 are paralleled by Pindar, fr. 121 Bowra, Sophocles, fr. 753 Nauck, and Euripides, Herc. Fur. 613, but I suspect that all of these passages, including that in the Hymn, are in fact reflections of a promise of felicity solemnly made to the initiates at some point, perhaps during the *μύησις*. This, as we now know, was performed separately for each individual, and it may therefore have included some instruction. See also note 7, below.

ing the cult.[3] The names of many of Athens' most distinguished leaders, Pisistratus, Cimon, Pericles, and Lycurgus, are associated with the successive remodelings of the sanctuary. In later times Hellenistic princes and Roman emperors presented themselves at Athens to receive the boon of initiation. Other mystery-cults of the Greek states were perhaps equally ancient, but none ever captured so fully the imagination of the ancient world, and the mere charge that Alcibiades and his friends had parodied the Eleusinian rites aroused a storm of emotion that affected the course of history at a crucial moment. Isocrates, in enumerating the benefits conferred upon mankind by or through Athens, significantly put first[4] the twin gifts of Demeter, the Mysteries and the cultivation of cereals, and it is hardly surprising that throughout the classical period Athens should have attempted to exploit the prestige of the cult and its associated myths to support her pretensions to the moral and cultural hegemony of Hellas.[5]

[3] IG I² 6 (before 460 B.C.), to be consulted now in the text established by B. D. Meritt, Hesperia 14 (1945), 61–81, and IG II² 1078 (ca. 220 A.D.).

[4] Panegyricus 28.

[5] Cf. IG I² 76, on the offering of first-fruits to the Goddesses, required of the Athenians and their allies, and urged upon all other Greek states. E. Will, REG 61 (1948), 1–18, dates the inscription late in 422/1 B.C., but refers the proposal to extend what had hitherto been a purely local custom back to 448 or 446 B.C.; on this see, however, the strictures of J.-L. Robert, REG 62 (1949), 102–3. Cf. also the prominence of Triptolemus in Athenian art from the end of the 6th century to about 440 B.C. (M. P. Nilsson, Geschichte d. griech. Religion I [München 1941], 629–30, 761). IG I² 6 (before 460 B.C., probably in connection with the official reorganization of the cult by the State after the Persian wars) formally attests the international importance of the Mysteries at this early period.

The success of the propaganda is more difficult to assess. The claim made by Isocrates (Panegyr. 31) in 380 B.C. that *most* states send these annual offerings of first-fruits is certainly not borne out by the records of 329/8 B.C. (IG II² 1672, 263 ff.), the only ones available. No doubt the orator is exaggerating (perhaps, as my colleague Professor Carl Roebuck has suggested to me, in terms of what was hoped from the Second Athenian Confederacy), but the records of a single year are not by themselves enough to discredit wholly his explicit statement. The tense political situation during the years after Chaeronea may have played a part, and it may also be significant that from 330 to 326 B.C. Greece was suffering from a severe food shortage. In any case, the repeated *κατὰ τὰ πάτρια καὶ τὴν μαντείαν τὴν ἐγ Δελφῶν* of IG I² 76 cannot be mere rhetoric, and the continued support of Delphi is also mentioned by Isocrates (Panegyr. 31): *πολλάκις ἡ Πυθία προσέταξεν ἀποφέρειν τὰ μέρη τῶν καρπῶν καὶ ποιεῖν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν τὴν ἡμετέραν τὰ πάτρια.* Probably recognition of the "obligation" varied widely at all times, and reflected political currents. — The references to the observance in Aelius Aristides (Panath. pp. 167–8 and Eleus. p. 417 Dindorf) are purely literary and prove only that Aristides had read his Isocrates. They do not, *pace* M. N. Tod, Greek Historical Inscriptions, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1946), 183, attest the survival of the practice "down to Hadrian's reign":

In striking contrast to this long and intimate association of the Athenian state and the Eleusinian cult stands the fact that the Homeric Hymn, which professes to record the institution by Demeter of her sacred rites, makes no mention either of Athens or of the Athenians.[6] To Athenian pride this must have been only less embarrassing than the insignificant rôle of the city in the Homeric epics, and it might seem well-nigh sufficient to account for the neglect of the poem. Certainly had the Hymn lent any color to Athenian pretensions it is hard to believe that it would have been so readily ignored, even though the Homeric Hymns in general were, apparently, but little read.[7] Actually, however, the problem is rather more complex and cannot be simply dismissed with so ready an explanation.

Not only is Athens not mentioned in the Hymn, but there is no hint or forecast there of the changes which were to ensue upon the union of Eleusis with its greater neighbor.[8] Triptolemus appears merely as one of the nobles of Eleusis, not as the son of Celeus, the king, and not yet as the culture hero and the agent of Athenian

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note *αἱ παρὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀπαρχαὶ δεῦρ' ἀφικνούμεναι καθ' ἕκαστον ἔτος τῶν σπερμάτων ἐπὶ τῶν προτέρων χρόνων* (Panath. l. c.), and the scholiast's mournful comment on the final phrase, *ὅτε τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἤνθει· ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῦ Ἀριστείδου ἀπέρρη* (read *ἀπερρύη*).

[6] Matthiae's proposal to read *Ἀθηναίοισι* for *ἐν ἀλλήλοισι* in line 267 is generally and rightly rejected, e.g. by Allen, Halliday, and Sikes, The Homeric Hymns, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1936), and by J. Humbert in his Budé edition (1936). C. Picard, however, accepts the emendation, and argues from it for dating the composition of the Hymn in the mid-sixth century (Revue de Philologie, ser. 3, vol. 4 [1930], 257–65; Revue Historique 166 [1931], 1–76).

[7] See Allen, Halliday and Sikes, op. cit., lxiv–lxxxii for an excellent summary of the evidence, and, for the Hymn to Demeter in particular, id. 109–10; the only actual citations of the Hymn appear in an Orphic papyrus of the 1st or 2nd century B.C., in Philodemus, and in Pausanias; Apollodorus seems to draw upon it, and several of the Alexandrian poets *may* have known it (to Allen and Halliday's list perhaps add Philicus: cf. D. L. Page, Greek Literary Papyri [Loeb Library] I, 403–4, but the evidence is slight). A. W. Persson, ARW 21 (1922), 309 claims that Isocrates, Panegyr. 28 ff. is dependent upon the Homeric Hymn; on the contrary Isocrates seems here to represent the "canonical" Athenian tradition, which quite ignored inconvenient features of the Hymn. It might be argued that Euripides, Helena 1315 ff., shows an awareness of line 424 of the Hymn. It should however be noted that in the play Athena and Artemis assist Demeter in her search, whereas in the Hymn, as in the later tradition (cf. Diod. 5.3, Paus. 8.31.2) they are companions of Persephone. Some association of the two goddesses with the principals of the story may have been a constant feature of the myth, yet they seem rather out of place in a list of Oceanids, and despite Allen and Halliday the line might be a later addition: so Wilamowitz, Glaube der Hellenen (Berlin 1931–2) II, 48, n. 1.

[8] Cf. Allen, Halliday and Sikes, op. cit., 112–4, and Mylonas, op. cit., 10–11.

propaganda that he was destined to become. Iacchus, naturally, is altogether absent, since he is no more than a personification of the procession from Athens to Eleusis, and this procession, which in later times was perhaps the most impressive part of the public ceremonial, is not envisaged in the poem.[9] Eumolpus is named, but there is no suggestion that his descendants are to enjoy any special status in the cult, and there is no reference at all to the Kerykes.[10] On the other hand the poet shows his familiarity with Eleusinian traditions unrelated to the mysteries,[11] and his detailed knowledge of the local topography has been convincingly demonstrated by Mylonas.[12] There is good reason therefore to assume that the poet was himself an Eleusinian.

The purely Eleusinian character of the Hymn has led most scholars to the natural conclusion that it was written before the union of Athens and Eleusis, or at any rate "before the reorganization of the mysteries under Athenian influence." [13] Unfortunately neither the date of the incorporation of Eleusis into Attica

[9] The identification of Iacchus with Bacchus, which is found as early as the 40's of the 5th century (Sophocles, Ant. 1150 ff.), was perhaps responsible for the introduction of Dionysus into the circle of Eleusinian deities, at least in popular belief: cf. Nilsson, op. cit., 629 and, for a more generous estimate, based on a study of the vase paintings, of the importance of Dionysus to the cult, H. Metzger, BCH 68–9 (1944–5), 323–39.

[10] There is no need here to enter fully the vexed question of whether the Kerykes were originally Athenian or Eleusinian. Picard (Rev. Hist. 166 [1931], 5–7) argues on very tenuous grounds that they were an Eleusinian clan who in the struggle between the two states had gone over to the side of the Athenians. They themselves claimed Athenian descent, though another tradition made Keryx the son of Eumolpus (Paus. 1.38.3). To judge by the evidence of the deme-names no Kerykes were residents of Eleusis at the time of the reforms of Cleisthenes, and this fact would seem to justify the statement of W. S. Ferguson, in Hesperia 7 (1938), 42, that "The Kerykes were an association, from which residents of the Thriasian plain were excluded, organized or reorganized after the conquest of Eleusis to give other Athenians a worthy share in the celebration of the Eleusinian Mysteries." At least one Eleusinian Eumolpid is known (IG II^2 1235) but even here the rarity of Eleusinians in the genos may, though it need not necessarily, imply the existence of a pre-Cleisthenic policy of curtailing the native Eleusinian element in the personnel of the cult. If the Eumolpids were originally a guild (cf. W. S. Ferguson, CP 5 [1910], 278–9), it is perhaps unwise, on the evidence, to think of the genos in the classical period as representing a strictly Eleusinian tradition, and in any case it should be noted that in the Homeric Hymn Eumolpus, like Triptolemus, is given no special prominence. It is none the less significant that nothing *whatever* in the Hymn points to the Kerykes.

[11] Perhaps the most striking instance is in lines 265–7, generally referred to the βαλλητύς, though this is hotly contested by Picard (see note 6).

[12] Op. cit., passim.

[13] Allen, Halliday and Sikes, op. cit., 113.

nor that of the composition of the poem can be fixed with certainty. A time close to the end of the seventh century for both seems not inconsistent either with the scant historical data[14] or with the linguistic evidence of the poem, but the absolute priority of one event over the other, cannot, in the present state of our knowledge, be settled beyond question.

Yet the problem is not altogether hopeless. If definite external criteria are lacking it is possible that considerations of a more subjective nature may suggest a solution which if not certain is at least possible and perhaps even probable. As before, the inquiry must begin with the poem itself, but setting aside as secondary the question of the date we must now rather examine the purpose for which the poem was written and the circumstances that evoked it.

Kern[15] has argued with much plausibility that as it now stands the poem represents an Eleusinian adaptation of a rhapsodic narrative of the Rape of Persephone. Be that as it may, it seems clear that though the Hymn is deeply concerned with the aetiology of the festival and of some specific points of the ritual, it had itself no proper place in the celebration of the mysteries.[16] There is of course no question here of a liturgical use, but one could readily imagine that at some time during the festival such a work might be publicly recited for the entertainment and edification of the assembled initiates. Yet, however risky the argument from silence, the fact that the Hymn has left no traces in Athenian literature makes it most improbable that such recitations occurred, with any

[14] Actually there is no clear proof that Eleusis was not definitively incorporated into the Athenian state till so late a date, but many bits of evidence, which may be found admirably summarized by Nilsson in Cults, Myths, Oracles, and Politics in Ancient Greece (Lund, 1951), 37–9, point to this; since it seems to be generally assumed, I have accordingly taken account of the presumed fact in my attempted reconstruction of events. Actually my essential argument is not affected one way or the other, since in any case the Hymn *is* evidence for a state of affairs in which the cult, if not the city, was free from Athenian influence.

[15] RE, s. v. Mysterien, col. 1212–1217.

[16] See Allen, Halliday, and Sikes, op. cit., lxxxiii–xcv for a discussion of the nature of the hymns ascribed to Homer. P. Foucart, Les mystères d'Eleusis (Paris, 1914), 261, suggests that the Hymn to Demeter may have been *composed* for a contest of bards at the agonistic festival of the Eleusinia, but as to the antiquity of this festival, beyond the fact that it existed ca. 500 B.C. (IG I^2 5), we have no definite information. It might equally well be argued that the original recital was intended for a celebration of the βαλλητύς (of which the Eleusinia may be a later development: Kern, loc. cit., col. 1215); this would account for the prominence of Demophon in the narrative, and give special point to Demeter's words in lines 263–7.

regularity at least, in the classical period, from, let us say, 500 B.C. on. It is, moreover, equally unlikely that if the Hymn had already become firmly established as a traditional feature of the celebration, it could have been ousted even under Athenian pressure. It would seem then that the occasion and purpose of the Hymn are to be sought elsewhere than in the immediate context of the religious rites.

There is some reason to believe that in the final settlement of their age-long strife Athens and Eleusis were united, not by armed conquest, but as the result of a treaty; Eleusis, that is to say, was not simply at the mercy of her larger neighbor but was able to negotiate her position.[17] It is tempting, in fact, to see in Pausanias' account (1.38.3) of the legendary war in the days of the kings Erechtheus and Eumolpus a reflection of the actual terms that concluded the later struggle: "The Eleusinians were to have independent control of the Mysteries, but in all things else were to be subject to the Athenians." Yet if these were the terms of the peace, they seem not to have been fully observed. Nilsson noted many years ago that the curious and apparently unnecessary arrangement whereby in historical times the *sacra* were brought in procession to Athens, remained there for four days (of which only one had real significance for the Mysteries), and were then taken back to Eleusis was not only a visible expression of the union of the two states, but in all probability represented an unsuccessful attempt to detach the Mysteries from Eleusis and establish them in Athens itself.[18]

It is easy to understand why the attempt might have been made. Evidently the cult was already famous and the privilege of initiation was not restricted to native Eleusinians.[19] Athens might well feel inclined, while the solidity of her union with Eleusis was not yet

[17] A. W. Persson, loc. cit., 293; Wilamowitz, op. cit., II 43–4.

[18] JDAI 31 (1916), 313–4. He notes especially that the procession to Athens occurred on the eve of the full moon day, which we should expect to be the chief day of the festival. It may therefore be that the final settlement involved a shift in date for the high days of the rites. For the calendar of the festival in classical times see now S. Dow, HSCP 48 (1937), 111–20.

[19] This seems to be the natural implication of lines 480–2 of the Hymn. The late stories (Apollodorus 2.5.12; Plutarch, Theseus 33) about the adoption of Heracles and the Dioscuri before their initiation suggest (what is in any case probable) that originally the cult was closed to aliens, but provide no safe criterion for the date of the change.

a demonstrated fact, to assure for herself the blessings and the prestige of the potent rites. As to the justification, if justification was needed, for such a transfer, Athens could point to her own ancient Mysteries at Agrae and Phlya, and presumably to the closely associated rites of the Thesmophoria,[20] which might have served as a native base on which the new cult could be superimposed.

For the history of the cult the archaeological evidence is suggestive, but far from conclusive.[21] That the cult extends back into Mycenaean times, as the ancient traditions clearly imply, now seems assured by the discovery, on the very site always occupied later by the telesterion, of an enclosed, free-standing Mycenaean megaron, which was almost certainly a sanctuary. Apparently without interruption the area preserved its sanctity down through the ages, but it was enlarged and reconstructed time and again. Some expansion occurred in the Geometric period, and again in the early Archaic period the enclosure was considerably enlarged, and the sanctuary itself was now rebuilt. The contents of a sacrificial pyre of this period indicate that the Archaic telesterion and

[20] The mysteries at Phlya were in honor of Ge (Paus. 1.31.4, Hippolytus, refut. 5.20), and were reputed to be older than the Eleusinian Mysteries.

The Thesmophoria were the most widespread of all Greek cults (M. P. Nilsson, Griechische Feste [Leipzig, 1906], 313), and in all probability existed independently at Athens even before the union with Eleusis. On the other hand since Athena retained even until late times agricultural functions at Athens, and since her festival the Arrhephoria seems to parallel almost exactly the Skira-Thesmophoria, it may well be that at some remote time Athens looked solely to Athena for divine protection of her crops. Of the three ritual ploughings of Attica, that beneath the Acropolis belonged to Athena, that in the Rharian plain to Demeter, and the third, near the ancient border between the states, was sacred to both. This seems to point to a compromise of rival claims (cf. L. Deubner, Attische Feste [Berlin, 1932], 47). — As Allen and Halliday (op. cit., 120–1) remark, some of the ritual references of the Homeric Hymn apply to the Thesmophoria as well as, or even better than, to the Mysteries proper, which may suggest that the two festivals were not always so sharply differentiated as in classical times. — It is perhaps worth noting also that the basic agricultural functions of the Eleusinian divinities were never forgotten, and continued to exert an appeal independent of the Mysteries. See the remarks of M. P. Nilsson in Eranos 42 (1944), 70–6 on the new *lex sacra* of the mid-fifth century from the Attic deme of Paeania (W. Peek, Ath. Mitt. 66 [1941], 171 ff. = Suppl. Epigr. Graecum 10, 38). In the cult practiced at the Eleusinion there, as in that at Marathon, the fertility of the crops is clearly the prime consideration.

[21] See K. Kourouniotes, ARW 32 (1935), 52–78 for the archaeological history, with however the reservations of L. Deubner, Abh. Berlin, Philos.-hist. Kl., 1945/46, nr. 2, pp. 17–9, on the question of a Geometric *temple*. Noack's conclusions on the antiquity of the cult, though still followed by Allen and Halliday as late as 1936, are outmoded in the light of the more recent discoveries.

its terrace were probably constructed towards the end of the 7th century.[22] There was again a major enlargement and a splendid rebuilding in the time of Pisistratus, and Kourouniotes marks this as the beginning of the real *Blütezeit* of the sanctuary. Towards the end of the 6th century Triptolemus emerges on Attic black-figured vases as the culture hero of agriculture, a rôle of which the Homeric Hymn gives not a hint.[23] The Pisistratean sanctuary was burned and ruined by the Persians in 479 B.C. (Hdt. 9.65), and the work of reconstruction is generally credited to Cimon. The Athenian decree regulating the Mysteries (IG I^2 6) is earlier than 460 B.C. and probably dates from this Cimonian reconstruction and reorganization.

The later history need not concern us. The cult was clearly subject to Athenian control before 460, and presumably at least from the time of Pisistratus. Kourouniotes even says of the Archaic reconstruction, "es kann dieses eine Folge der Vereinigung von Eleusis mit Athen gegen Ende dieses [the 7th] Jahrhunderts gewesen sein."[24] This suggestion, though attractive, is not specifically required by the evidence, and does not in any case necessarily imply Athenian interference in the traditional conduct of the rites, much less the bold attempt to transfer them to Athens postulated by Nilsson. On the other hand the attempt to assert Athenian control would come more naturally at a time fairly soon after the political union rather than after the religious situation had had time to crystallize. If we can trust the statement of Andocides (de myst. 111) that a law of Solon required the Boule to meet in the Eleusinion on the day after the Mysteries, some measure of Athenian regulation may have existed as early as 590 B.C.[25] However

[22] G. E. Mylonas and K. Kourouniotes, AJA 37 (1933), 282.

[23] Nothing is said in the Hymn of the *discovery* of cereal agriculture, which was later so important a part of Athenian cultural propaganda. The account of the Marmor Parium, lines 23–9, is particularly worth noting (for the dependence of the Marmor upon the Atthides cf. F. Jacoby, Atthis [Oxford 1949], 227, n. 5): Eleusis is given its due, with the localization there of the first cultivation of grain and the revelation of the Mysteries, but the prior "invention" of grain by Demeter is significantly set "upon her arrival in Athens."

[24] ARW 32 (1935), 66.

[25] This might seem to give a terminus ante quem for the attempt to transfer the cult to Athens, since the words of Andocides make it clear that the Eleusinion is not the sanctuary at Eleusis but that in Athens. Unfortunately the historical implications of the passage cannot be pressed. O. Broneer has argued convincingly (Hesperia 11

this may be, we are entitled to assume that by the Pisistratean period the cult had attained in all major essentials the form that is familiar to us later: the Mysteries at Agrae had been made an obligatory preliminary for admission to the Great Mysteries; the Kerykes, whatever their origin, had been made co-administrators with the Eumolpids of the cult; certain preparatory rituals had been transferred and localized in Athens, thereby providing occasion for the great public procession between the cities; and perhaps already the subtle reworking of the legend had begun which was, among other things, to displace and obscure Demophon as the favorite of Demeter to make way for the more effective Triptolemus.

In all probability changes of so great moment were not brought about overnight, and they may represent a gradual evolution extending through many years, at the maximum even through the whole period of fifty years or more separating the early Archaic and the Pisistratean reconstructions. In their totality they virtually assured to Athens the substance, though not the form, of what she had sought. In her immediate objective, however, Athens had certainly failed. She had not been able to remove the rites bodily to Athens, and she was forced to rest content with a compromise.

This failure bespeaks strong opposition from Eleusis. All the combined forces of religious conservatism and of local pride would arouse the Eleusinians to resist the attempt on their most ancient and hallowed cult. What particular arguments, pleas, and pressures were put forth we do not know, but it is, I believe, in the light of this struggle (and therefore *after* rather than *before* the political union), that the Homeric Hymn to Demeter can be best understood.

To Eleusis the wandering Demeter had come in her sorrow. At Eleusis she had received hospitality. At Eleusis she had directed that her temple be built, and there, to the Eleusinian nobles, she had revealed her sacred and secret rites, whereby men were assured sustenance in this world and a blessed lot in the world here-

[1942], 250–74) for the identity of the Thesmophorion at Athens with the Eleusinion *ἐν ἄστει*. Presumably the more ancient Thesmophorion was given the broader name Eleusinion at some point in the events after the annexation of Eleusis, but since the two terms were thereafter interchangeable, it may well be that the law of Solon, which Andocides does not profess to quote verbatim, actually used the name Thesmophorion. At the outside the passage would seem to indicate that by the end of Solon's regime, the state was actively interested in the cult, and that the political union had therefore already occurred.

after. Athens is ignored, and at least once in the poem is pointedly ignored: the disguised goddess professes to have come to Eleusis from Thoricus, and to do so she must either have passed through or skirted close to Athens; yet it was not at Athens but at Eleusis that she deigned to stop, found welcome, and ordained her Mysteries. By way of a polemical appeal to tradition, the argument of the poem could hardly be bettered.

No other occasion earlier or later seems quite so suitable for the composition of the Hymn. Only in this one context can we satisfactorily account both for the poem and for its subsequent history. With all its Eleusinian coloring it is not a cult hymn in the proper sense, nor did it have any established place in the ritual. Called into being by a crisis, it was hastily concocted, very likely, as Kern argues, by the adaptation of an old rhapsodic *προοίμιον* and the not always skilful insertion of the purely local material. Hence it was not as an artistic *κτῆμα ἐς αἰεί* that it was, in the first instance, conceived and produced, but rather as a piece of literary propaganda, intended to effect a given purpose at a given time. This purpose it performed. Then, when the crisis was past and the respective claims of Athens and Eleusis had been adjusted, it was allowed to fall into almost complete oblivion, from which it was not to emerge until brought into the light again, centuries later, by the antiquarian interests of Hellenistic poets and scholars.

ALBINUS AND PLOTINUS ON DIVINE ATTRIBUTES

H. A. WOLFSON

On two previous occasions I tried to show how neither Plato nor Aristotle held that God was unknowable, ineffable, and unnameable,[1] how the tentative objections against the unknowability of the ideas raised in the Parmenides and Sophist are answered by Aristotle,[2] how in the extant literature of Greek philosophy prior to Philo there is no conception of a God who is unknowable and unnameable and ineffable,[3] how Philo arrived at the conception of an unknowable, ineffable, and unnameable God,[4] how he may have meant it to be either an interpretation of Plato or something in opposition to him,[5] and how the description of God as ineffable found in Albinus and Plotinus may have been due to the influence of Philo.[6] We may add here that, though Plotinus attributes his conception of a hierarchy of three hypostases to Parmenides as reported by Plato [7] and though it is also to that Parmenides that he may refer by the pronoun "he" in his statement, "he says that it (the One) cannot be spoken (*ῥητὸν*) or described (*γραπτόν*)," [8] neither the views which he attributes to Plato nor the language which he quotes from him are those of Plato. They are rather those of older interpreters of Plato,[9] and among them Philo is to be included.[10]

[1] "The Knowability and Describability of God in Plato and Aristotle," Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, 56–57 (1947), 233–249.

[2] Ibid., pp. 239–249.

[3] Cf. Philo, II, pp. 113–117.

[4] Ibid., II, pp. 118–126.

[5] Ibid., II, pp. 117–118; 112–113.

[6] Ibid., II, pp. 158–160.

[7] Enn., V, I, 8 (23–27). The numbers within parentheses in the references to the Enneads are to the numbered lines in E. Bréhier's edition (Plotin: Ennéades, 1924–1938).

[8] Ibid., VI, 9, 4 (11–12); cf. Parmenides 142A. (In Philo, II, p. 160, n. 78, and p. 484, this reference to the Enneads is misprinted "V, 9, 4").

[9] Cf. É. Bréhier, Plotin: Ennéades, V, p. 13; VI, 2, p. 176, n. 1; A. E. Taylor, The Parmenides of Plato, pp. 145 ff.; E. R. Dodds, "The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic 'One,'" The Classical Quarterly 22 (1928), pp. 129–142; A. H. Armstrong, The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus, pp. 14–28.

[10] It is only fair to warn the reader that there are scholars who believe with E. R. Dodds that "that Plotinus himself could take . . . Philo . . . as an author-

Now in Philo the view that God is ineffable (ἄρρητος), unnameable (ἀκατονόμαστος), and incomprehensible (ἀκατάληπτος) [11] leads him to the conclusion that, while the existence of God can be known from the things created by Him, His essence cannot be known,[12] and therefore the question is raised by him how one can speak of God, or rather how one is to interpret the predicates by which God is described in Scripture.[13] The problem as it presented itself to the mind of Philo is that those predicates cannot be any of the terms which usually constitute predicates, for they can be neither accidents, nor genera, nor species.[14] Plotinus, in a similar way, immediately after his statement that God is "ineffable" (ἄρρητον),[15] that "he has no name (οὔτε ὄνομα αὐτοῦ),[16] and that "he cannot be grasped by thought" (οὔτε ἐστὶ νόησις αὐτοῦ),[17] asks: "How then are we to speak of Him?" [18] The problem as it presented itself to his mind is stated in two passages. In one passage, after stating that all questions refer either to essence or quality (that is, accident) or cause or existence, he shows first that God has neither accident nor cause and, then, like Philo, he says in effect that, while the existence of God can be known from the things which proceed from Him, His essence cannot be known.[19] In another passage he argues that God cannot be of the same genus with other beings, for in that case "He would differ from them only in property (ἰδίῳ) or specific difference

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ity I find it hard to believe" (art. cit., p. 140, n. 1) and "that any attempt to extract a coherent system from Philo seems to me foredoomed to failure; his ecclecticism is that of the jackdaw rather than the philosopher" (ibid., p. 132, n. 1). But there are others, such as E. Vacherot (Histoire critique de l'Ecole d'Alexandrie, I, 1846, pp. 166–167); H. Guyot (L'infinité divine depuis Philon le Juif jusqu'à Plotin, 1906, pp. 99–100; Les Reminiscences de Philon le Juif chez Plotin, 1906); and long before them the Church Father Eusebius of Caesarea (Historia Ecclesiastica II, 4, 2; cf. Philo, II, p. 158), who believe that Plotinus could have been influenced by Philo, or that he was actually influenced by him either directly or indirectly. As for the jackdawish ecclecticism of Philo, see discussion in Philo, I, pp. 97–115.

[11] Philo, II, p. 111.

[12] Ibid., II, p. 73.

[13] Ibid., II, p. 127.

[14] Ibid., II, pp. 130–131; 109–110.

[15] Enn., V, 3, 13 (I).

[16] Ibid., (4).

[17] Ibid., (37).

[18] Ibid., V, 3, 14 (I).

[19] Ibid., VI, 8, 11 (5–13).

(διαφορᾷ) or accident (προσθήκῃ)." [20] In other words, like Philo, he contends that the predicates of God can be neither accidents nor genera nor species. And so also, before him, Albinus, after stating that God is ineffable (ἄρρητος) [21] and that hence He is "not genus (γένος) nor species (εἶδος) nor difference (διαφορά)," [22] begins to discuss the various ways in which one may form a thought or conception (νόησις) of God.[23] Evidently he was troubled by a problem, and that problem, as we shall see, was a twofold problem, one part being how we are to speak of God.

The answer given by Philo, formally, is that all the predicates of God in Scripture describe Him only by what is known of Him by the proofs of His existence. Now the proofs of existence establish only the fact that there is something beyond the world which is the cause of it and which acts upon everything in it. Accordingly, he takes all the descriptions of God in Scripture to refer only to the causal relation of God to the world, that is, to His actions. Informally, however, Philo adds another theory of divine predicates, and that is negations. For following the scriptural example, which says "God is not like a man," [24] Philo uses many negative descriptions of God, all of which are taken by him to emphasize the unlikeness of God to things in the world.[25] Still Philo does not say outright that, as a result of the unknowability and ineffability of God, He is to be described by negations. Nor does he apply the principle of negation as an interpretation of those predicates in Scripture which are couched in positive form.

In Albinus and Plotinus, however, negation is mentioned explicitly as one of the ways of predicating of God. In Albinus, there is a threefold classification of the methods by which we can form a conception of God, and one of these is negation.[26] In Plotinus, there are two classifications. In one of them,[27] like Albinus, he

[20] Ibid., V, 5, 13 (21–23).

[21] Didaskalikos, X, 3 and 4. The section numbers are those of the edition of the Didaskalikos in Fr. Dübner, Platonis Opera, vol. III, 1873, pp. 228–258; Pierre Louis, Albinos: Epitomé, 1945.

[22] Ibid., X, 4.

[23] Ibid., X, 5–6.

[24] Num. 23:19; cf. Philo, II, p. 97.

[25] Philo, II, pp. 126–127.

[26] Didask., X, 5–6.

[27] Enn., VI, 7, 36.

enumerates three methods by which we can form a conception of God, and these three methods correspond in vocabulary, though not in the order of their arrangement, to those enumerated by Albinus. In the other classification,[28] he deals with the ways in which we can speak of God, and here, again, despite the vagueness of the text, one can make out that the ways enumerated by him are three, and that they are the same three that are enumerated by Albinus and also by himself in his first passage, though couched in different language and arranged in a different order.

"The first method of forming a conception of God," says Albinus, "will be by the abstraction (ἀφαίρεσις, literally, "taking away," "removing") of these [sensible predicates mentioned before], in the same way as we form a conception of a point by its abstraction from the sensible, namely, by first forming the conception of a surface, then that of a line, and finally that of a point." [29]

The passage as it stands would seem to deal not with the manner in which we can speak of God, but rather with the method by which we can arrive at a conception of God, that is to say, the method by which we can arrive at a belief in the existence of God. But we shall try to show, on the basis of what we have reason to believe is the source of Albinus' statement here, that its purpose is to explain not only the method by which we can prove the existence of God but also the manner in which we can speak of God.

In al-Nairīzī's Arabic commentary on Euclid's Elements, in his comment on Euclid's definition of a point as that "which has no part," [30] there is a quotation from Simplicius' lost Greek commentary on the Elements, which reads as follows: "Euclid thus defined a point negatively because it was arrived at by the abstraction of surface from body, and by the abstraction of line from surface, and by the abstraction of point from line. Since then body has three dimensions it follows that a point [arrived at after successively eliminating all three dimensions] has none of the

[28] Ibid., V, 3, 14.

[29] Didask., X, 5. See comments on this passage in E. R. Dodds, Proclus: The Elements of Theology, p. 312; R. E. Witt, Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism, p. 132.

[30] Euclid, Elements, I, Def. 1.

dimensions, and has no part." [31] In other words, in this comment, the method of forming the conception of a point by successive abstractions of surface and line and point is used by Simplicius as an explanation of the question why Euclid has defined a point in negative, rather than in positive, terms.

It will be noticed that the description of the successive abstractions of surface, line, and point in Simplicius (6th cent. A.D.) is exactly the same as that used in the passage we have quoted from Albinus (2nd cent. A.D.). We have, therefore, reason to believe that the statement of Albinus here is only a fragment of a comment on Euclid's definition of a point which, like the passage of Simplicius, tried to explain Euclid's negative definition of a point. Accordingly, in his application of this statement here as an explanation of our conception of God, what he means to explain is not only how we can form a conception of God but also how we can describe God, and, with regard to the latter, his explanation is that we can describe God negatively, in the same way as Euclid defines a point negatively.

That this is how Plotinus understood Albinus is evident from the two passages in his Enneads, which correspond to this passage in Albinus. In his first passage, dealing, as does Albinus, with the methods by which we may form a conception of God, he says, using the same term as Albinus, that one of these methods consists of "abstractions" (*ἀφαιρέσεις*).[32] In his second passage, answering directly the question as to how we are to speak of God

[31] Cf. Anaratii in decem libros priores Elementorum Euclidis commentarii ex interpretatione Gherardi Cremonensis, ed. M. Curtze, 1899, p. 2, ll. 19–23: Dixit propterea Sambelichius: Punctum ideo negando Euclides diffinivit, diminutione superficiei a corpore, et diminutione linee a superficie, et diminutione puncti a linea. Cum ergo corpus sit tres habens dimensiones, punctus necessario nullum earum habet, nec habet partem." Quoted in T. L. Heath, The Thirteen Books of Euclid's Elements, p. 157. This passage is missing in the edition of the Arabic text by R. O. Besthorn et J. L. Heiberg under the title of Codex Leidensis 399, I. Euclidis Elementa . . . cum commentariis al-Narizii, 1893, p. 8. I take it that the term *diminutio* in the Latin, which Heath has translated by "detaching" but which I have changed to "abstraction," reflects the Greek *ἀφαίρεσις* (cf. below n. 93), probably through the Arabic *naqṣ*, for the Greek verb *ἀφαιρέω* has also the meaning of "to diminish." The Arabic verb *naqaṣ* as a translation of the Greek *ἀφαιρεῖν* occurs in the Arabic translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics (See M. Bouyges, "Index alphabétiques," p. 269, Nos. 1413–1414, in his edition of Averroes: Tafsir ma ba'ad at-tabi'at, Vol. III, 1948).

[32] Enn., VI, 7, 36 (7).

and evidently in explanation of the meaning of the term "abstractions," he says as follows: "Though we do not grasp Him by knowledge, we do not completely fail to grasp Him; we grasp Him enough to say something about Him, without, however, expressing Him himself; for we say what He is not, but what He is we do not say." [33] That the statement in this second passage, namely, that we say of God "what He is not" was meant to be an explanation of the term "abstractions" used by him in his first passage, may be gathered from a third passage, where, dealing again with the question of how God can be spoken of, he says explicitly that "everything that is said of God is only by way of abstraction." [34]

From the fact that the term *aphairesis*, which we have translated by "abstraction," but which literally means "taking away," "removing," is explained by Plotinus to mean that we predicate of God "what He is not" but not "what He is," we may infer that it is used by him, and also by Albinus before him, as the equivalent of the term *apophasis* (*ἀπόφασις*), which is used by Aristotle in the technical sense of "negation" in a logical proposition.

Now in Aristotle, "negation" in its strictly technical sense of a logical negation is contrasted with the term "privation" (*στέρησις*) or "privative negation" (*στερητικὴ ἀπόφασις*).[35] "Privation" or "privative negation" refers only to an affirmative proposition in which the predicate is a privative term, such as "the man is blind," and it is used only with reference to a subject of which, under normal conditions, the opposite of the privative term in question could be predicated, as, for instance, the "man" who is said to be "blind" could normally have been "seeing." "Negation," on the other hand, refers to a proposition which is negative in quality, and in such a proposition the negation of the predicate is possible even of a subject of which that predicate never could be affirmed, as, for instance, the proposition "the wall is not seeing." [36] Accordingly, when Aristotle says that "as a brute

[33] Ibid., V, 3, 14 (4–7).

[34] Ibid., VI, 8, 11 (34–35).

[35] Metaph., IV, 2, 1004a, 14–16; IV, 6, 1011b, 18ff; X, 5, 1056a, 15–18.

[36] The example of "wall," which is used by Maimonides as an illustration of the difference between "privation" and "negation" Millot ha-Higgayon, ch. 11; Moreh Nebukim I, 58) is taken, as I have shown from Alexander's commentary

has no vice and virtue, so neither has a God; but his state is more precious than virtue, and that of a brute is something different in kind from vice," [37] he means thereby that such propositions as "the gods are not virtuous" or "brutes are not virtuous" are not "privations" but rather "negations," inasmuch as the negation of virtue of them does not imply that gods and brutes can be described as wicked. The assumption is that they are excluded from both virtue and wickedness, gods on account of their being above virtue and wickedness, and brutes on account of their being below virtue and wickedness. Though neither Albinus nor Plotinus says directly that by *aphairesis* he means technically the same thing that Aristotle means by *apophasis* in contradistinction to *steresis*, many statements made by them clearly show that this was their view. Thus, for instance, Albinus says that God can be described neither as bad nor as good,[38] and Plotinus similarly says that God is "neither what is movable nor what is at rest," [39] that He "neither knows anything nor is there anything of which he is ignorant," [40] and that He "has neither the not-good nor the good." [41] The implication of all these statements is that both Albinus and Plotinus use the term *aphairesis* in the technical sense of Aristotle's *apophasis*.

"The second method of forming a conception of God," continues Albinus, "is by way of analogy, to be explained as follows. In the case of the sun, its relation to the sense of sight and to the objects seen is such that, without being itself the sense of sight, it imparts to that sense the power to see and to the objects of sight the power to be seen. Of the same nature is the relation that the First Mind bears to the faculty of thinking in our soul and to the objects of our thought, for, without being itself the faculty of thinking, it imparts to that faculty the power to think and to

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on Aristotle's Metaphysics IV, 6, 1011b, 15 ff. (ed. M. Hayduck, p. 327, ll. 18–20). Cf. "Maimonides on Negative Attributes," Louis Ginzberg Jubilee Volume (1945), pp. 425, 427.

[37] Eth. Nic., VII, 1, 1145a, 25–27.

[38] Didask., X, 4.

[39] Enn., VI, 9, 3 (42).

[40] Ibid., VI, 9, 6 (48–49).

[41] Ibid., V, 5, 13 (5).

the objects of thought the power to be thought of, and that by its bringing to light the truth which is inherent in the latter." [42]

This analogy between the first mind or God and the sun, it may be remarked,[43] is taken from Plato's analogy between the idea of good, which is "the cause of science and of truth," [44] though it is not itself science and truth,[45] and the sun, which "imparts to the visibles not only the power of visibility but also generation and growth and nurture, though it is not itself generation." [46] Now in Plato this analogy is used as an explanation not of the specific problem of how one can speak of the idea of good but rather of the more general problem of how one can come to the knowledge of the existence of the idea of good. Albinus, however, may be taken to use this second method of analogy, just as he has used the first method of negation, as an explanation also of how one can speak of God. What Albinus, therefore, means to say here is that, while one cannot speak of the essence of God, one can speak of His causal relation to the world or of His actions in the world, and hence also of his existence, for it is from the analogy of sight and visibility and the sun that we know that there is a God who has a causal relation to the world, and it is, therefore, this causal relation of God to the world that we can speak of.

So also, in the corresponding passages of Plotinus, the analogy is used both as a method by which we arrive at a knowledge of the existence of God and as a manner in which we can speak of God. Thus, in his first passage, he says that we are led to a knowledge of the existence of God by "analogies" (*ἀναλογίαι*).[47] In his second passage, in answer to the question of how we are to speak of God and quite evidently in correspondence to what Albinus and he himself in the first passage call "analogy," he says as follows: "There is nothing to prevent us from grasping Him, even though we are incapable of expressing Him in words. An illustration

[42] Didask., X, 5.

[43] Cf. reference to Plato in J. Freudenthal, Hellenistische Studien, Heft 3: Der Platoniker Albinos und der falsche Alkinoos, p. 285, and in Pierre Louis, op. cit., p. 60, n. 143.

[44] Rep., VI, 508 E.

[45] Ibid., 509 B.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Enn., VI, 7, 36 (7).

thereof is the case of those who are inspired and possessed. They know only that much, that they have within themselves something greater than themselves, without, however, knowing what it is. But from their agitations and utterances they receive a certain feeling of the Cause which produces those agitations and utterances, even though they differ from that Cause. In this manner also, it seems, is our relation to God. When we acquire a pure intellect, we feel that God is the Mind within, who furnishes essence and other things of the same order, but is not himself these things, for He is something superior to that which we call being; He is too ample and too great to be called by us being; He is superior to reason, intellect, and sense; He imparts these things, but is none of them." [48]

This passage, though it does not contain the term analogy is parallel to the passage about analogy in Albinus and to his own use of the term analogy in his first passage. The analogy here, to be sure, is not between sight, in its relation to the sun, and the human mind, in its relation to God; but rather between inspiration, in its relation to God, and thinking, in its relation to God. Still the principle which this analogy is trying to establish is like that in the analogy used by Albinus, namely, that, though God is not identical with the human mind, there is still a causal relation between God and man's thinking. What Plotinus means to say here is that, though we cannot speak of the essence of God, we can still speak of His causal relation to our mind, inasmuch as it is from His causal relation to our mind that we arrive at a knowledge of the existence of God.[49]

"The third method of forming a conception of God," concludes Albinus, "is of this kind. Whenever man beholds that which is beautiful in bodies, he passes on from that to the beauty that is in the soul, then to the beauty that is in morals and laws, then to the vast sea of beauty, after which he discerns the good itself, the lovable itself, the desirable itself, which, as if it were light, brings brightness and illumination to the soul in its effort thus to ascend. Together with his beholding all this, man forms also

[48] Ibid., V, 3, 14 (8–19).

[49] On the proof of the existence of God from the human mind, see Philo, II, pp. 78 ff.

a conception of God in his mind, [without, however, beholding Him, and this] on account of the exaltedness of His position." [50]

This passage is based upon a passage in Plato,[51] in which he tries to show how by starting with the contemplation of "beautiful bodies" [52] one passes on to "the beauty which is in souls," [53] then to "the beauty which is in morals and laws," [54] then to "the vast sea of beauty," [55] until finally he arrives at the notion of "the beautiful itself" [56] and becomes "the friend of God." [57] Now here, again, in Plato, this description of the successive gradation of knowledge is not used as an explanation of the specific problem of how one can speak of absolute beauty, but rather of the more general problem of how one can come to the knowledge of the existence of absolute beauty. Still in Albinus, again, as before, we may assume, it is used also as an explanation of the latter problem. How this description of the successive gradation of knowledge can be used as a solution of the problem of how one can speak of God may be gathered from the two corresponding passages in Plotinus.

In the first of these passages Plotinus merely says that we are led to a knowledge of God by "the knowledge of things proceeding from it and certain grades of ascension." [58] But in the second passage, directly in answer to the question of how we can speak of God, he says: "We speak of Him from things which are after Him." [59] In other words, just as we arrive at a knowledge of His existence by the contemplation of the gradation of things in the world, that is, the causally interconnected things, which proceed from God and of which He is the cause,[60] so also, in speaking of

[50] Didask., X, 6. The last sentence in this quotation reads: *τούτῳ δὲ καὶ θεὸν συνεπινοεῖ διὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ τιμίῳ ὑπεροχήν.* Pierre Louis (op. cit., p. 62) translates it: "à ces idées on ajoute alors celle de Dieu, qui se distingue par son excéllence."

[51] Cf. reference to Plato in J. Freudenthal, op. cit., p. 286, and in Pierre Louis, loc. cit., n. 144.

[52] Sympos., 210A.

[53] Ibid., 210B.

[54] Ibid., 210C.

[55] Ibid., 210D.

[56] Ibid., 211C.

[57] Ibid., 212A.

[58] Enn., VI, 7, 36 (7–8).

[59] Ibid., V, 3, 14 (7–8).

[60] The reference here is to the Aristotelian proof for the existence of God from the interconnection of all things in the world as cause and effect. Cf. Phys. VIII, 4–5.

God, we describe Him in His causal relation to these things in the world which proceed from Him.

The three kinds of divine predicates enumerated by Albinus and Plotinus are thus reducible to two kinds, negations and actions, for the predicates described as analogies and as certain grades of ascension are really one type of predicate, both of them, as we have seen, describing God in His causal relation to the world or His actions. And so in one passage, where he summarizes his view, Plotinus mentions only two kinds of predicates. "If anyone attributes to Him anything at all," he says, "be it essence or intelligence or beauty, by that attribution one takes away from Him His nature of being the Good. Therefore, let us take away everything from Him and let us affirm nothing of Him . . . And so also, let us not attribute to Him any of the things posterior to Him or inferior to Him, but let us bear in mind that, being above all of them, He is their cause, without being Himself any of them." [61] In other words, let us describe God only by negations or by his causal relation to things posterior and inferior to Him.

But, according to Albinus and Plotinus, not only can God be described by predicates which are negative and active in form, but He can also be described by predicates which are positive or non-active in form, provided they are understood as being negative or active in meaning. While neither Albinus nor Plotinus explicitly discuss this point, we may gather that this is their view from certain statements they make. Thus Albinus describes God by the predicate "complete in himself" (*αὐτοτελής*) but explains it to have the negative meaning of "without want" (*ἀπροσδεής*).[62] Similarly Plotinus describes God by the predicates "one" (*ἕν*) and self-sufficient (*αὐτάρκης*) but explains the former to mean "indivisible" (*ἀμέριστος*) [63] and the latter "not in want" (*ἀνενδεής*).[64] Thus, again, Albinus describes God by the predicates "good" (*ἀγαθός*) and "truth" (*ἀλήθεια*) but explains the former to mean that "He does good (*ἐνεργετεῖ*) to everything according to its [receptive] ability and is the cause (*αἴτιος*) of every good," [65]

[61] Enn., V, 5, 13 (9–20).
[62] Didask., X, 3.
[63] Enn., VI, 9, 5 (38–41).
[64] Ibid., VI, 9, 6 (24–26).
[65] Didask., X, 3.

and the latter that "He is the principle (ἀρχή) of every truth." [66] Similarly Plotinus attributes to God the terms "good" and "thinking activity" (νόησις), but he explains the former to mean that "He is good for other things, if they are able to receive some part of it," [67] and the latter that "it is the cause which makes some other being think." [68] It is this also, we may assume, that Plotinus means by his statement that "one must say that He lives, if indeed He gives life." [69] The meaning of this statement is that one must not say that He lives except in the sense of His being the cause of life.

These three methods enumerated by Albinus and by Plotinus as leading to a knowledge of God are described by Plotinus as methods of scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) or of thinking (νόησις).[70] In contradistinction to these methods of scientific knowledge, however, Plotinus mentions another method which he calls vision (θέα, θέαμα).[71] Of these various methods, that of vision is described by him as being "superior" to those of scientific knowledge,[72] and scientific knowledge is described by him as being "prior" to vision,[73] that is, as being preparatory and hence inferior to vision. He also tells us what means are to be employed in order to attain to vision. They are "purifications and virtues and refinements and ascents to the intelligible, abiding therein and feasting there on its delights." [74]

Now the distinction between these two kinds of knowledge, the indirect and the direct, scientific knowledge and vision, is not new with Plotinus. By his time there were already two types of such a distinction, that of Plato and that of Philo. Both Plato and Philo, the former with reference to the ideas and the latter with reference to God, find that there is a distinction between indirect knowledge attained by reason and direct knowledge attained by vision. The former, according to both of them, is ultimately based

[66] Ibid.
[67] Enn., VI, 9, 6 (40–42).
[68] Ibid., (53–54).
[69] Ibid., III, 9, 9 (17–18).
[70] Ibid., VI, 9, 4 (2).
[71] Ibid., (14, 17).
[72] Ibid., (3).
[73] Ibid., VI, 7, 36 (4).
[74] Ibid., (8–10).

upon sense perception; the latter is completely supersensible. But, though Philo is undoubtedly dependent upon Plato in his description of his direct knowledge of the vision of God, there is still a difference between him and Plato as to the nature of that direct knowledge of vision. The difference is as follows: To Plato the vision of the ideas comes by recollection; to Philo the vision of God comes by revelation.[75] To Plato, again, it comes naturally to any one who is properly prepared to receive it; to Philo, while proper preparation is necessary, it comes as an act of divine grace.[76] Plotinus seems to have been conscious of the difference between these two types of supersensible vision and to have consciously aligned himself with Plato as against Philo. Consequently, in his presentation of his own view, while reminiscently making use of Philonic phrases, he gives them a non-Philonic meaning.[77] Reminiscences of Philonic phraseology are to be found, for instance, in one passage where he speaks not only of the soul as ascending by its own power to the good but also of the Good as that which "causes the thinking soul to move towards it, so that in its motion it sees the Good," [78] or in another passage where, in describing the desire of the soul for intelligible objects, he says that "each intelligible object becomes an object of desire only when the Good makes it glitter, by giving graces (χάριτας), as it were, to desired objects and love to those who desire." [79] All this sounds like Philo's description of the vision of God in his statements that God called Moses and spoke to him "so that he might receive the clear vision of God from the First Cause himself" [80] and that "it was impossible for anyone to comprehend by his own unassisted power the truly Existent, unless He himself revealed and manifested himself to him." [81] Still, despite the language he uses, Plotinus could not have meant by it literally that his God comes to the assistance of man in gaining a knowledge of Him, for in opposition to Philo, he says explicitly that God acts

[75] Cf. Philo, II, pp. 83–85; 92.

[76] Ibid., II, pp. 47–51.

[77] On the analogies and differences between Philo's and Plotinus' conceptions of vision see R. Arnou, Le Désir de Dieu dans la Philosophie de Plotin, pp. 224–227.

[78] Enn., V, 6, 5 (7–8).

[79] Ibid., VI, 7, 22 (6–7).

[80] Leg. All., III, 33, 102.

[81] Abr., 17, 80.

without "will" (οὐδε βουληθέντος) [82] and in opposition, again, to Philo, he denies the scriptural story of the creation of the world by design and purpose.[83] Moreover, in opposition even to Aristotle, his God has no "knowledge of himself," [84] no "thinking" and no "consciousness." [85] Plotinus' vision of God, therefore, unlike that of Philo, can have no element of grace in it.

But here a question comes up. Vision is said by Plotinus to be superior as well as posterior to scientific knowledge [86] and, furthermore, the predicates of God which are derived from scientific knowledge, those predicates which are negations and causal relations, are described by him as only "directing us toward Him and rousing us to pass from reasons into vision." [87] Are we then to infer that, according to Plotinus, vision gives man a complete knowledge of God's essence? Now, in Philo, as we have shown,[88] the vision of God does not give man a complete knowledge of God's essence, though the knowledge it does give is greater than that given by rational demonstration. A similar view, we believe, can be shown to have been held also by Plotinus. For, in one passage, in a description of those who have a direct vision of God, to whom he refers as those who are able "to harmonize with Him and, as it were, to lay hold of Him and to touch Him," [89] he says that "they can see Him so far as He is visible according to His nature." [90] Not all the essence of God, then, becomes known to those who have a vision of Him. Then, in another passage, in a description of what is supposed to be the vision of the Good, he speaks only of the vision of the light that radiates from the Good.[91] Thus, again, it is not the essence of the Good itself in its entirety that becomes known to those who have a vision of it, but only the light that radiates from it.

In our foregoing analysis of the treatment of divine attributes

[82] Enn., V, 1, 6 (26).
[83] Ibid., V, 8, 7.
[84] Ibid., VI, 7, 38 (10).
[85] Ibid., VI, 9, 6 (51).
[86] Cf. above, n. 72.
[87] Enn., VI, 9, 4 (13–14).
[88] Cf. Philo, II, pp. 91–92, 149
[89] Enn., VI, 9, 4 (26–27).
[90] Ibid., (29–30).
[91] Ibid., VI, 7, 36.

in Albinus and Plotinus, and especially in the latter, we have tried to bring out certain advances made upon Philo's treatment of the same subject. To begin with, there is, in both Albinus and Plotinus, a formal classification of the attributes, in which negations are included. Then there is an indication that both of them use the term negation in its strictly Aristotelian sense, as opposed to privation. Then, also, both of them use the terms negation and causal relation not only with reference to predicates which are negative or causative in form but also with reference to predicates which, though not negative and not causative in form, are taken as much in meaning. From now on formal classifications of divine attributes, with the inclusion of negation as one of the types of attributes and the use of negation in the technical Aristotelian sense of the term and also the application of negation to predicates which are positive and non-active in form, become common characteristics of the treatment of divine attributes in religious philosophic literature, be it Christian or Moslem or Jewish, though further developments, of course, are to be found in later literature, especially in the works of Maimonides.[92] In all these Plotinus is to be considered the proximate source, though the ultimate source of the entire problem of divine attributes is to be found in Philo.

As an example of the continuity of tradition from Albinus and Plotinus throughout Greek and Latin and Arabic and Hebrew philosophic literature, we may take the Greek term *aphairesis*, which, as we have seen, is used by both Albinus and Plotinus in the technical sense of logical negation and as the equivalent of the term *apophasis* as used by Aristotle. Now neither in Plato nor in Aristotle nor in the Stoics is the term *aphairesis* used in the logical sense of *apophasis*. In Aristotle the only technical meaning that the term *aphairesis* has, beyond its ordinary meaning of "taking away" or "subtraction," is that of "abstraction" with reference to mathematical concepts.[93] But once this term has acquired the technical sense of logical negation with Albinus and

[92] Cf. my papers "The Aristotelian Predicables and Maimonides' Division of Attributes" in Essays and Studies in Memory of Linda R. Miller (1938), pp. 201–234; "Maimonides on Negative Attributes" in Louis Ginzberg Memorial Volume (1945), pp. 411–446.

[93] H. Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, s. v.

Plotinus it continues to be used in that sense throughout Greek, Arabic, Hebrew, and Latin philosophic literature, especially in connection with divine attributes. Thus in Christian Greek literature, the term *aphairesis* is used interchangeably with the term *apophasis*, in connection with divine attributes, by both Dionysius the Areopagite [94] and John of Damascus.[95] In Arabic and Hebrew philosophic texts, while the Arabic term *salb*, Hebrew *shelilah*, usually translates the Aristotelian *apophasis* [96] and the same term is also used as a description of divine attributes which are negative,[97] still the Arabic *nafy*, which reflects the Greek *aphairesis* [98] and of which the Hebrew translations are *harḥaḳah*, *biṭṭul*, and *silluḳ* is used in connection with the negative attributes in an identical expression which occurs both in Maimonides [99] and in Averroes.[100] And so also in mediaeval Latin philosophy, the term *remotio*, used in the sense of *negatio*, in the expression *via remotionis*, is a translation of the Greek *aphairesis*.[101]

[94] De Divinis Nominibus II, 4 (PG 3, 641 A); De Mystica Theologia II (1000B).

[95] De Fide Orthodoxa I, 4 (PG 94, 800 BC).

[96] Cf. Die Hermeneutik des Aristoteles in der arabischen Übersetzung des Isḥāḳ ibn Ḥonain, ed. Isidor Pollak, Glossar, p. 42, s.v.

[97] Cf. Maimonides, Moreh Nebukim I, 58.

[98] In the Arabic translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics IX, 3, 1047a, 14, the Arabic verb *nafa* translates the Greek ἐξαιρεῖν (cf. ed. Bouyges cited above, p. 269, No. 1410), which means the same as ἀφαιρεῖν.

[99] Moreh Nebukim, I, 51, Arabic: *nafy al-ṣifāt*; Hebrew: *harḥakat ha-to'arim* (Ibn Tibbon); *biṭṭul ha-middot* (Ḥarizi). Cf. also Ḥobot ha-Lebabot, I, 10, Arabic text, ed. A. S. Yahuda, p. 72, ll. 6 and 9: *al-sawālib min ṣifāt;* Hebrew: *ha-shollot be-middot* and *wa-kull mā yunfa 'anhu min al-ṣifāt*; Hebrew: *we-kal ha-meruḥakot mi-mennu min ha-middot.*

[100] Tahafot al-Tahafot, VI, 19, p. 320, l. 11 (ed. M. Bouyges): *min nafy al-ṣifāt*; Hebrew: *be-silluḳ ha-to'arim* (Kalonymus ben David ben Todros).

[101] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Contra Gentiles, I, 14. I do not think Munk is right in taking the Latin *remotio* to be a translation of the Arabic *nafy* (cf. Le Guide des Egarés, I, 58, p. 239, n.). He has overlooked the Greek *aphairesis.*

JOVIUS AND HERCULIUS

Diocletian, as we all know, included religion in his schemes for the regeneration of the Roman State and put forward a new formulation of paganism, by which he placed himself under the special protection of Jupiter, while his fellow Augustus, Maximian, stood under the protection of Hercules, and the Caesars, Galerius and Constantius Chlorus, appointed in A.D. 293, owned as patrons Mars and Sol respectively. Several aspects of the new religious policy have already been sufficiently emphasized. It was definitely conservative, in that Diocletian did not, like Aurelian, claim for the Eastern Sun-God the 'dominatus imperii Romani,' but went back to the traditional chief god of Rome — Jupiter, 'the Best and Greatest.' It was in accordance with the spirit of an age, which was learning more and more to conceive of the divine powers as companions and preservers ('conservatores' and 'comites') of the rulers.[1] It took account of the new configuration of the Empire under the Tetrarchy of Diocletian and his colleagues. The divine sphere was to be rounded off, to represent the earthly.[2] And we may add, in all probability, that account was taken of the very Roman conception of the Genius, the spirit of life in the individual, and that Diocletian and Maximian, when they took the titles of Jovius and Herculius, meant to suggest that, though they were not actually identified with Jupiter and Hercules, they bore in themselves the spirit of the two gods. It is tempting to suppose that the 'Iovi Augg.' of the coins was intended to suggest just this. The idea would be helped out by the fact that the spirit of the individual woman was actually called 'Juno.' I want, in this little paper, to suggest yet another consideration, not quite so obvious and not quite so well observed, that may have entered into the calculations of Diocletian.

Diocletian's chief difficulty in founding a single religion for the whole Empire lay in the dissident minorities, and the chief of these was the Christian Church. Growing in numbers, in social status and in power of internal organization, it had already seemed to Trajan Decius and

[1] See A. D. Nock in JRS 1947. I am still inclined, as against him, to think that in the process the divine world sank in estimation compared with the earthly.

[2] Either Minerva, the vice-gerent of Jupiter, or Apollo, his son, 'young, beautiful and health-bearing,' could be used as type of the Caesar. Septimius Severus introduced the gods of his native Leptis Magna, Hercules and Liber, as his 'di auspices'; and, of the two, Caracalla appropriated to himself Hercules, Geta Liber. But no regular expression in religion of the rule of two Augusti had been devised.

Valerian a challenge to the State which must be met. True, the persecutions had failed of decisive success and Gallienus had granted what amounted to toleration to the Church. But the discord still remained and had still to be resolved. What if Diocletian, in his new system of Jupiter and Hercules, meant to offer an interpretation of paganism, which might be so far acceptable to the Christians as to induce them to pay that modicum of conformity, in return for which Rome was always ready to grant toleration for the rest?

There are several considerations which lead me to think that Diocletian calculated thus. The first is that, zealots on both sides apart, there must have been many who were anxious to find a basis for peace. Was not the worship of Jupiter and Hercules really very similar to the worship of the Christian Church paid to God the Father and God the Son? Diocletian, with his wife and daughter and many of his retinue Christians, will have known something of Christian belief — just enough, we may suppose, to make him imagine that his proposed compromise was easier than it actually turned out to be. The second is that Diocletian only proceeded to persecution after many years had elapsed and is thought by many only to have taken the final, decisive step at the urgent prompting of his Caesar, Galerius. The third is derived from a reading of Arnobius, the African rhetorician, who wrote his pamphlet, 'Adversus Paganos' at just about the time of the outbreak of the persecution. Let us listen to some of the things he says. The pagans themselves claim that Jupiter is 'Best and Greatest'; therefore 'una religio est nobis vobisque communis.' Christ, declares Arnobius, deserves worship at least as much as Liber, Ceres, Minerva and 'denique Hercules,' for his services to the human race. Not only Christ died a shameful death; so too did pagan gods — Aesculapius, Liber, 'et ipse Hercules.' God is 'virtutum caput' and Jesus Christ was the supreme example of divine 'virtus' manifested on earth. Finally, says Arnobius, 'ergone inquiet aliquis . . .' 'deus ille Christus est?.' 'Deus' respondebimus 'et interiorum potentiarum deus.'[3] We are moving here in a world of thought, familiar to the paganism of the Empire. The gods are immanent as well as transcendental; they work, not only in the universe, but also in the soul of man, Hercules, in particular, had often been adopted as a symbol of the good Emperor — by Trajan, Hadrian, Commodus, Septimius Severus, Postumus, Probus and, now, by Maximian. He was coming, more and more, to be identified with the divine 'virtus,' working in the soul of the Emperor. The theology of Arnobius, be it

[3] Arnobius I. 35: I. 38, IV. 6: II. 41: I. 56ff.: I. 65: I. 42.

noted, is almost exclusively concerned with God the Father and God the Son. The full Trinitarian doctrine, with God the Holy Spirit as the third person of the Godhead, hardly, if at all, appears. Does not the implicit similarity between Jupiter and Hercules on the one hand and God the Father and God the Son on the other become almost explicit in him? I have chosen Arnobius as my witness, not because he is the best evidence for Christian orthodoxy, but because he shows so clearly how a converted heathen was disposed to represent his new faith to his erstwhile companions.

If, as I believe, this attempt at conciliation was made, it undoubtedly failed. The decision came into the hands of the extremists, the great persecution ran its course and, finally, came the Edict of Toleration from Galerius and the definite favorings of the Christians by Constantine. Since Christianity declined to own defeat, Constantine decided to find in it the one religion of his united Empire. But he soon came up against the difficulty that this one religion was not perfectly at one in itself. It had its schismatics and heretics. Constantine had first to contend against the Donatists, then against the far more widely spread Arians. The great controversy between the Athanasians and the Arians — between the conception of Christ as ὁμοούσιος or ὁμοιοούσιος with the Father — had wide implications and can obviously not be explained by any one formula. But I would seriously suggest that in one aspect — perhaps the most important aspect of all — it was a struggle to preserve the integrity of the sacred mysteries of Christianity against a new invasion of paganism from within. Christianity had refused to accept Jupiter and Hercules as adequate expressions of God the Father and God the Son. An almost exactly similar conception now arose inside the Church. If Christ was definitely subordinate to the Father, His relation to Him came very near to that of Hercules to Jupiter; the fight, fought and won outside the Church, might be lost inside it. The Church had to contend against an interpretation of its beliefs meant to suit old beliefs, widely held — not unlike the fight of Christians in modern Germany against the 'deutsches Christenthum' of Hitler. One can hardly doubt that such barbarians as the Goths, who so readily adopted the Arian creed, carried into Christianity something very like a worship of Jupiter and Hercules or their barbarian equivalents.

I am not attempting here to reveal any hitherto unknown facts — only to suggest some aspects of known facts of so general a character that their significance, for that very reason, may be overlooked. If one approaches the final struggle of paganism with the notion that it was a dead and decaying system, one is hardly likely to find much

interest in the gestures that it makes in its death agony. But if we regard it — as I maintain that we should — as a way of conceiving of the universe, hallowed by long use and glorified by art and literature, we shall think of it as still alive in its decline, still seeking reinterpretations that might suit the changing demands of the times, and not succumbing in the fight without leaving its mark on its triumphant rival. Christianity under Constantine must have had to welcome hosts of new converts of an embarrassing character, who followed the sun of the imperial favor, but brought with them hearts and minds still almost purely pagan. We shall not be the first to wonder whether the gain brought to the Church by Constantine really outweighed the loss.

HAROLD MATTINGLY

3 MORTIMER ROAD
CAMBRIDGE, ENGLAND

RETRACTATIO

In an article in this review (vol. 43, 1950, p. 184), I adversely criticized Theophilus of Antioch for his distortion of Epicurean teaching in the treatise Ad Autolycum III 7 (p. 202, 11 Otto). Theophilus certainly knows little enough about Epicurus, but at this point it is not he who has distorted the Epicurean teaching, but the corrector of Cod. Marc. gr. 496, who was followed by the copyists of Cod. Bodl. gr. misc. 25 and Cod. Paris. gr. 887, as well as by all later editors. The original reading of the Venice manuscript is correct, as it is at several other points where Otto has emended the text.

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School of Theology
University of the South
Sewanee, Tennessee

BOOKS RECEIVED

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